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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O,F UTAH 
TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
ST,\TE OF UTAH, 
Plait1tiff-Appellant, 
-\'S.-
SKAGGS DRUG CENTERS, INC., 
GRAND CENTRAL STORES, INC., 
cl/h/a vVARSHAW'S GIANT 
FOODS and GRAND CENTRAL 
DRUGS, INC., 
am l 
lJTAH RErrAIL GROCERS' 
ASSOCIATION, 
Int crrcnor-A ppellant. 
Case 
No.11034 
BRIEF OF DF~FENDANT-RESPONDENT GRAND 
(~ENTRAL STORES, INC., d/b/a W ARSHA WS 
OJ ANT F-,OODS aml GRAND CENTRAL DRUGS, INC. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action commenced by the Trade Com-
mission of Utah seeking an injunction against each of 
tht' defendant-respondents to enjoin them from selling 
merchandise in \'iolation of the Utah Unfair Practices 
,\et. In particular, defendants are charged with viola-
1 
tions of ~13-5-7 and ~13-5-9, Utah Code AnnotateJ (8upp. 
1967) (the Unfair Practices Act). The Utah Retail Cho-
cers' Association was allowed to intervene i11 the trial of 
the matter and has filed a brief. 
DISPOSITION I~ THJ1~ LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried to the court without a jur~·. 
Based upon the stipulations of the parties and the evi-
dence brought out at trial, the court held the Unfair 
Practices Act in its entirety to be unconstitutional, void 
and unenforceable in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution, and in viola-
tion of the Utah Constitution. 
The ruling of the lower court was based upon its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law filed and entered 
herein in the record at pages 35 through 48. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-respondent Grand Central seeks an af-
firmance of the judgment in the lower court and a decla-
ration by this court that the Utah Unfair Practices Act 
is invalid, unconstitutio1w.l and 0110nforcea ble. 
STATE.l\I.B~N'l' OF' FACTS 
The statement of facts as contained in appellant's 
ln·ief is substantially correct though incomplete. The 
statement of facts contained in the brief of appellant-in-
tervenor in many respects is substai1tially incorrect arnl 
not based upon the record in the case. 
SiILce neith0r appellant nor intervenor-appellant has 
s('t forth a complete ancl accurate statement of the facts 
founcl in this cas0, clefendant-respondcnt proposes as its 
statement of facts the Findings of Fact entered by the 
court. Those firnli11g-s as herein material were: 
3. vVith respect to Count I of plaintiff' s com-
plaint, def endaILts offered no defense thereto ex-
c0pt the defense of unconstitutionality of the Act. 
The allegations of Count I of the complaint must 
accordiILgl)' he taken as true and the court there-
fore finds that on .Tune 23, 1966, defendants, and 
0ach of them, advertised Crest Family Tooth-
paste at i10¢ which is a sale helow cost as defined 
in the Act, with the intent and purpose of induc-
ing the purchase of other merchandise or of un-
fairl)· dinrting trade from a competitor or other-
wise injuring a competitor and defendants will 
continue to sell such item below cost as defined 
in the Act unless tlwy art> enjoined from such 
activity. 
4. As alleged in Count II of plaintiff's com-
plaint and as stipulated to by the parties, on or 
ahont .June 16, 1966, Shopper's Discount Food 
Store, Jnr., herein referred to as" Shopper's Dis-
count," acfrertised and sold Aqua Net Hair Spray 
at Ml¢ which was a sale below cost as defined in 
the A ct. 011 .June 23, 1966 Grand Central adver-
tisecl Aqua Net Hair Spray and Skaggs adver-
tised St:de Hair Spray for sale at 49¢, each of 
·which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act. 
1\qna Net Hair Spray and Style Hair Spray are 
rompetitin? arnl comparahle products ·with regard 
to \\·eigM, ~ize, use, price mid customer demand. 
Shopper's Discount, Skaggs and Grand Central 
are all competitors in the same locality or trade 
area comprising Salt Lake City and Davis Coun-
ties. Grand Central 's ach·ertisement and sale of 
Aqua Net Hair Spray at 4-9¢ and Skagg 's ndver-
tisement and sale of Style Hair Spray at 4-0¢ was 
an endenYor hy said defrndm1ts to med the 4-0¢ 
price of Shopper's Discount on Aqua Net Hair 
Spray. Neither of said clef endants at said time 
had any actual knowledge that the Shopper's Dis-
count price on such item was a sale below cost as 
defined in the Act or was not a legal price for pur-
psoes of Section 13-5-12 of the Act. On or prior 
to June 23, 1966, plaintiff had not, to the knowl-
edge of either of the defendants, taken any action 
against Shopper's Discount to enforce the pro-
visions of the Act against Shopper's Discount 
with respect to its sale of Aqua Net Hair Spray 
for 49¢. Aqua Net Hair Spra.Y is a product with 
wide wholesale price fluctuations which can he 
purchased by retailers, including defendants and 
Shopper's Discount, in numerous ways and from 
many different suppliers. Neither Skaggs nor 
Grand Central on or prior to June 23, 1966 made 
any inquiry of Shopper's Discount or the sup-
pliers of Aqua Net Hair Spray to Shopper's Dis-
count to determine the invoice cost of Aqua Net 
Hair Spray to Shopper's Discount or the rcplnce-
ment cost of such item or the date of purchase of 
such i tern by Shopper's Discount. Shopper's Dis-
count as a competitor of <lcf endants would not 
voluntarily supply defendants with information 
relative to its invoice cost, replacement cost or 
date of purchase of such item. The wide price fluc-
tuation and numerous wholesale sources of supply 
and differing purchasing methods made it infeas-
ible and unrealistic for defendants to obtain re-
liable information of the invoice cost, replacement 
cost or date of purchase of such item by Shopper's 
Discount. 
7. With respect to Count V of plaintiff's com-
plaint, on June 23, 1966 defendants, and each of 
4-
them, :HhertisPd Bayer Aspirin (100 cm) at 55¢ 
per lnmc1rcc1. Bayer Aspirin is supplied and de-
lin'rrd clirectl!T to the clcfenclants' retail outlets 
])y the supplier without cartage costs to the de-
fendants. Bayer Aspirin is a product in constant 
demand by customers of defendants with a high 
turn-over and with little labor, 1rnste, spoilage or 
adn1iising costs to defendants. The sale of Bayer 
Aspirin at 55¢ hy Grand Central was not a sale 
below cost as defined in the Act, but the sale of 
the same item at the same price by Skaggs was 
a sale below cost as defined in the Act. 
9. With respect to Count VII of plaintiff's 
complaint, on June 16, 1966 Grand Central acl,Ter-
tised Lee men's pallJts at two pairs for $5.00, 
which was a sale below cost as defined in the Act. 
The sale by said defendant was not done with the 
intent to induce the purchase of other merchan-
dise, to unfairly di,Tert trade from a competitor, 
or to otherwise injure a competitor but was done 
with the sole intent and purpose of reducing what 
Grand Central in good faith believed was an ex-
cessive inventory in their stores at that time of 
Lee men's pants. 
10. \:Vith respect to Count VIII of plaintiff's 
complaint, on November 8, 1965 Grand Central 
purchased frozen tom turkeys at 331/2¢ per pound. 
Thereafter, on December 17, 1965 (more than 
thirty days after the original purchase) addition-
al frozen tom turkeys were purchased at an in-
\Toice cost of 371/2 ¢ per pound. On December 17, 
1965 and thereafter, Grand Central had in stock 
commingled frozen tom turkeys purchased on No-
vember 8, 1965 at 331h¢ per pound and tom tur-
keys purchased on December 17, 1965 at 371/2¢ per 
pound. The commingled turkeys were subse-
quetly sold by Grand Central on and after De-
cember 17, 1965 for :n ¢ per pound, which was a sale 
below cost as defined in the Act, in that the tur-
keys purchased N ovcmher 8, 1965 vvere sold more 
than thirty days from the date of such purchase 
and the replacement cost of the same at that time 
was 37V:2¢ per pound and thE' turkeys purchaserl 
on December 17, 1965 were sold at 37¢ which is a 
sale below cost as defined in the Act. The sales 
h~v Grand Central on or prior to DecemhE'r 8, 1965 
of the turkeys purchased on N ovemher 8, 1965 
were not sales below cost as defined in the Act. 
11. Defendants offer for sale a wide variety 
of merchandise in their retail stores, each item 
of which has individual cost factors such as (a) 
variance in consumer demand for the product, (b) 
rate of turn-oYer, ( c) cost of adYertising, (cl) 
handling costs, including warehousing, marking, 
packaging, displaying, and purchasing costs, ( e) 
,-arying depreciation in value sometimes depend-
ing on perishahility or seasonal demand and 
sometimE's depending on obsolescence factors 
(e.g., an improved product comes ou the market), 
( f) labor, overhead and administrative costs, and 
( g) trade and cash discounts, some of which can-
not he determi1wcl or are not lrnown to dE>fend-
ants at the time the goods are priced for sale. 
12. Defendants, each using separate types of 
accounting methods for the purpose of deterrmin-
ing proper profit and cost guidelines for their 
merchandising opt>ratio11s, are each using sound, 
arcepted and practical accounting procedures 
with as much E'mphasis 011 detail as feasible. 
Neither defendant attempts to accurately deter-
mine their cost for each item they sell, as to do 
so would he too costly and, heneP, impractical am1 
not feasible. Defendants cannot reasonabl~v he re-
qnirE'cl to establish acconnting procedures ~where-
(i 
by their actual eost per item sold could be deter-
mim•d at or prior to the sale or offering for sale 
of such item. 
PRELHI I:N" ARY STArrEMENT 
Since this appeal involns a challenge to the consti-
tutionality of a statute, the general maxims of statutory 
eom;truc.tio11 should be before the court. Defendant-re-
spollllent Gra11d Central substantially agrees with the au-
thorities cited hy appellant and intervenor-appellant 
f hc•reinafter referred to generally as appellants] as to 
the duties of this court with respect to declaring a statute 
unconstitutional. A summary of the preliminary state-
ments of appellants on this point can be ma.de as fol-
lows: In order to be unconstitutional, a statute must be 
clearly \'iolative of a constitutional provision. Reason-
able presumptions must be indulged in favor of the va-
lidity of the statute. If there is any reasonable basis for 
the finding of validity, a statute must be upheld. De-
J\•ndm1t-1·espoll(lent does not argue with these authori-
ties. '.\loreonr, it completely agrees that a statute 
sl10ulrl he clec-larecl nuco11stitutio11al only when there is 
no othr>r alternative. 
ARGUl\fENT 
The lltah Unfair Practices Act, involved in this 
C'Hi'll', wa;.; enaekd hy the' Utah Legislature in 1937. The 
Legisla t nn• was reacting to a popular fad of the time. 
:-.r auy of the states wl1ich han similar legislation adopt-
<·d it at that time. These statutes were passed under 
p1·pssl1l'e from com1Jetitors seeking to limit the play of 
free-market prices, and in response to a prP\-alent mar-
keting technique of the time, loss-leallcrs. Sale Bef 011' 
Cost: Pri1;ate Pritc Fi.xi11_r7 r~11der Stotc Lau-, 57 Yal1· 
L.J. 391 (1948). At that time, retailing as it is kit0\\"ll 
today clicl not exiNt. Integration of the retailing-whole-
saling and jobber functions liacl not lieen accomplished 
to the degree and extent of toda;-. Under marketing 
conditions then existing, when a retailer desired to pur-
chase an item, he would generally purchase the item from 
a wholesaler. Wholesalers were bound under the Robin-
son-Patman Act to treat all retailers alike. Howen'r, 
under the present-day distrilrntion s;-stem, many opera-
tions such as clefcrnlants in this case perform their mm 
wholesaling ancl/or jobbing func.tions. In purchasing di-
rectly from the manufacturer, these retail operations can 
obtain and do obtain a much better price than can a com-
petitor on a smaller operation who must purchase from a 
wholesaler. 
POINT 1 
THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT, 
IN THE ABSENCE OF PROOF OF A LES-
SER COST, COST AS DEFINED IN THE 
ACT MEANS 6% ABOVE INVOICE OR RE-
PLACEMENT COSrr, LESS TRADE DIS-
COUNTS, EXCEP'r CASH DISCOUNTS, PLUS 
FREIGHT CHARGES 'WHERE THE RE-
TAILER PAYS F' 0 R THE FREIGHT, 
CRBJATES AN ARBITRARY, UNREASON-
ABLJ1~ AND l'.NCONSTITrrrrONAL STAND-
ARD. 
In its presumption tl1a ( the co:-:t of <loi11g business 
shall "in the absence of proof of a lessor cost ... be 6~; 
8 
()]' tlH· eost to the retailer ... '·, section 1:3-5-7 ( 3) (Jf the 
l'tnlt Fnfair Practices Act does not take into account the 
differrnt possible types of retail operations nor the 
1 arious types of merchamlise \\·ithin each type of opera-
tion. The fact tli::it the statute does not make proYision 
for r1iffere11t forms of operation is not surprising since 
at the time of its adoption there was only one general 
tnie of retailing opreation. A presumption that the 
cost of doing husiness of a large-scale, self-service op-
eration s11ch as defendants, \nth the integrated functions 
of l'ctailN-wholcsalcr mid johber and that of a one-man 
e11n10r grocery store who purchases his stock from a 
\dJOlesaler is the same is totally outside of the com-
mon experience of man and is hence arbitrary and m1-
1\·;1so1wl1le. F:ice Serrer v. Ci9arefte Serrice Co., 76 1\.E. 
~d 91 (Ohio 1947). 
Tltis unreasonable and arbitrary classification was 
110t made by the L0gislature. The classification has been 
nwde lJy a shift i11 legitimate business practice. At the 
time th1• Legislature adopted the statute, the classifica-
tion may well ha,-c been reasonable. HoweYer, the facts 
i1tlrn<lneecl in this case and the findings of the court 
1·l1·nrl.\- show that the classification as applied to defend-
ant;; becomes unreasonable and arbitrary because it does 
not take into account their type of operation. 
In C:reat Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. 
Snpp. 70, 82 (D. 1\Ii1111. 1938) the court set forth the 
proper test for a Yalid presumption when it stated: 
It is apparent from [cited decision of the U. S. 
Supreme Court] that in determining the validity 
of a presumption created b31 a legislatfrc body, 
two questions arc ot be cnnsid er Pd: ( 1) Whether 
the fact preswmerl may be fairly inferred from 
the fact proven; (2) whether the presumption 
created will be of aid to the state without subject-
ing the accused to unreasonable hardship or op-
pression. (Emphasis added.) 
The presumption under the Utah Act meets neither of 
the above tests. In its operation, the Utah statutory pre-
sumption of a cost of 6% is not a fair presumption and 
it places an unreasonable burden upon the retailer. Cf. 
Mott's Super Markets, Inc., v. Frassinelli, 172 A. 2d ;)81 
(Conn.1961); Wiley v. Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A. 2d 289 
(Me.1956). This court should take into account the opera-
tional effect of the statute in question in order to see if 
the tests are met. Such consideration is in accord with 
Utah precedent. The case of Broadbent v. Gibson, 140 
P.2d 939 (Utah 1943) was a case involYing the consti-
tutionality of the Utah Sunday Closing laws. Beginning 
at page 946, the court makes au extensive discussion of 
the Utah statute and its exceptions. The court reached 
the conclusion that the exceptions to the Act were so 
hroad that they, in eff0ct, changed the Act from a ge11-
eral Sunday Closing law to a speeial Sunday Closi11µ; 
law, and hence made it unconstitutional. The court goes 
on to state that: 
The exceptions in the Utah 8unclay closi11g stat-
utes are so hroad that they in effect change the 
nature of this aet from a general closing law, with 
exceptions, to a law aimed, without sufficient le-
gal reason, at certain class0s of husinesses with a 
gene>ral exceptio1l to otlwr clm·rne;; \\·hich in effect 
is a grant of a special priYilegt' to the e>xcepted 
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elasR while without legal excuse denying them to 
others. Broadbent v. Gibson, supra at 946. 
The court further points out that these Sunday Closing 
,c;tatntes were designed to avpl:v in enry locality and to 
en'ry merchant throughout the state. As designed, the 
court holds, such uniform application does not take into 
account differences to be found in the various localities 
throughout the State and hence is unreasonably discrimi-
1intory. Broadbent Y. Gibsou, su]Jra, at 946-47. 
The Court goes on the state that in its opinion this 
;.;tatnte could be construed in a manner which would make 
it constitutional, but the Court does not so construe it. 
'l'lms, the Court states: 
r I] t could reasonably be held that the intention of 
the Legislature in providing that confedionary 
stores could stay open for the sale of confections 
onl:- aml tobacco stores for the sale of tobacco 
only \\·as designed to prohibit only the sale of 
sneh items as razor hlades, stationery supplies, 
IJirws, eigar and cigarette holders etc., rather than 
to prohibit the sale of candy in a tobacco store 
ancl Yice yersa. But the sta.tutes are arwku·ardly 
dra1cn awl 11 1hilc the overall intent seems to be 
r1s outlined nf'xt abore, the specific exemptions 
made and the language used in making them seem 
to defeat the mm1ifest oL·erall intent. And even if 
such 011 i1derprefotion were giren to the statutes, 
t11ere zcould still be difficult problems of adminis-
tration ich ich possibly iuould creat imconstitution-
(fl discriminations i11 such administration. Broad-
!Je llf Y. Gibson, supra, at 947. (Emphasis added.) 
Rasc·<l upon this reaso11i11g, the Court held the statutes 
to ll0 nneo11stitutio11al as being unreasonably discrimi-
11ntory. rrhc Utah U11fair Practices Act here challenge(l 
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suffers from these same defects and shoulcl also be con-
strued to he unconstitutional in its application. See Ser-
rer Y. Cigarette Scrrice Co., supra. 
Intervenor-appellant attacks the court's conclusions 
that the Utah Act is discriminatory and arbitrary in its 
application to both large and small merchants. They citc 
in support the case of People v. Gordon, 234 P.2d 287 
(Calif. 1951), and quote extensively therefrom. In ana-
lyzing the case of People v. Gordon, its factual basis 
should first be considered. This was a case which arose 
out of an injunction proceeding whereby defendants 
were first enjoined, without opportunity for hearing, 
from selling below cost. Defendants' motion to dissolve 
the order was denied and after further hearing an order 
was entered granting the injunction. It is significant to 
note the following statement of the court found on page 
291: 
Moreover, ''state laws will not be invalidated 
without the support of relevant, factual material 
'''hich will 'afford a sure basis' for an informed 
judgment" [cases cited]. In this case, no facts 
whaterer have been adduced u:hich afford any 
basis for judging the manner in LChich the art 
affects interstate shipments or burdens interstate 
commerce. (Emphasis added.) 
It should be noted that the main contention of def end-
ants in the Gordon case was that the California Act "'as 
in violation of the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. 
Another factual mattcr which should be consiclere<1 
in the Gordon case is the fact that the store Leing en-
joined was a small one-storP operation. One of its argn-
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me11ts ~was that the statute ~was unconstitutional in that 
lnrge chain stores could buy at substantially lower prices 
anu hence could sell at lower prices than the small store 
nrnl come within the law. The defendant contended that 
small stores were prevented from competing with these 
larger concerns because the smaller stores could not sell 
below their own higher cos,t. It will be noted that the 
l'xact opposite is being argued in the case at bar. The 
large stores are merely arguing that they should be able 
to take a<lvantage of their better buying position and 
se>ll at lower prices without having to put up with the 
arbitrary and unreasonable six percent presumption of 
the Utah Act. 
At page 294 of the Gordon opinion, it appears that at 
the hearings there was some evidence introduced (ex 
1iart!!) as fo the affect of defendant's low-cost advertis-
i 11g. Competitors of defendant were called in to testify. 
Howe,·er, the court admits that there was not much evi-
dence. lt \ms sufficient, however, to support the discre-
tion of the trial court in granting the injunction. 
In sum, it should be noted that the Gordon case did 
not present a set of facts upon which the court could 
deeick the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Act. 
Tt shonlcl also be noted that in that case the fact situation 
was exactly opposite that presented in the case at bar. 
There, a one-store operation was alleging that it should 
he allowed to sell below cost in order to meet the natural-
])" lower costs (although legal) of the large discount op-
(•ra tion. Iu the case at bar, all that defendant contends 
is that the large discount operation should be allowed to 
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sell at its cost plus operating expelli-J('S without the re-
quirement of the six percent conclusive presumption. 
Intervenor-appellant seems to argue that defenda11t 
should haYe put on t•vidence showing that the six percent 
presumption was not a Yalid estimate as to cost of doing 
business. At page 28 of its lffief, intenenor-appellm1t 
states: 
How0Yer, there is no evidence as to ·what a rea-
sonable percentage mark-up is in regard to any 
item involYed in this case. 
Of course, there is no e,-ide11ce on this point. The whole 
pm·pose of this case is to show that defendants cannot 
determine what a reasonable percentag-e markup would 
be in nch-ance of :o:ale,,;. 
Intervenor-appellaut objects to tlw finding of the 
lower court that no real alternative exists to the pre-
sumption since it is impossible or unreasonable for ck-
fendants to have to compute their costs on each item of 
groceries. Inten-enor-appella11t claims that this six per-
cent presumutiou i11 fact aicls the clcfern1auts and gins 
them ''an option; a retnilc1· ma:- eitlwr undertake the 
detailecl accounting which thP ad r0qnires or merely pre-
sume a cost of doing business equal to six percent." Brief 
of internnor-appellant at 2.). Cases cited ])y intenenor-
appC'llant make it quite clear that in an:- statute which 
grants ·a presumption, thP lffesumption or the fact pre-
sumed must be reasonably related to the fads in exis-
tencP. It is :-rn1nnitk<l that the six percellt presumption 
irnlnlg-ecl in liy tlio Utah statute hears 110 reasonable re-
lationship to all~' ;1etnal fact. 'rhe lower court so fonll<l. 
I11tern•nor-appel1n11t rrn1k<>s mnrh of tl1<> fact that de-
frn<lauts arc largr reiailrrs and lia.\·e access to computers 
(Brief at 26) "\Yhieh coul<l easily make the allocation" 
required by the statute. It is common knowledge that 
('Onipnters cannot make an allocation which a man can-
110t make. The informatio11 must be fe<l into them in or-
drr to get an answer. 
At page 26 of its brief, intervenor-appellant makes 
th<' argument that mere economic effect of the statute 
should not he considered when ruling upon the constitu-
tionalities of the statute. Any number of cases can 
be cite<l which hold that economic effect may he the cause 
of holding a statute unconstitutional. 'rl1is is the essence 
of due process and equal protection. If the economic 
<>ffrct of a statute is such as to unreasonably deprive one 
of his proper or :rnbject him to unreasonable discrimina-
tion, it could certainly be the basis of holding a statute 
1mconstitutional. See Broadbrnt v. Gibson, supra. 
lnt<·1·,·enor-appellant makes much of its argument that 
the six percent pesumption was enacted to aid the re-
tailc•r rather than restrict him. This is not the case. 
Snell presumptions are enacted as an aid to the prosecu-
to1·. Jfr~Rll/()11e v. (/eror, 292 N.W. 414 (Minn. 1940). 
When thr statute pro,·ides that i11 the absence of ai-
rle11ce to the contrary, the eost of doing business shall be 
111·0.'rnmPd to he six percent, a burden is placed upon the 
1·l'taik)r to come up with P\"i<lence to the contrary. It is 
\\'ell k11own as shown hy the fimli11gs aud the conclusions 
of this ea:-;c arnl th0 evi<le11ec addueccl in this case that a 
n)tailer cannot rcasmwhly show any cost prior to the 
nctnal sale of ;111 itrm. 'l'herdore, the six percPnt pre-
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sumption becomes a conclusive presumption, and irrebut-
table by the retailer. He must sell at the arbitrary mark-
up of six percent or act at his peril. 
At page 34 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites 
State v. Co11su1ner's TVarehousc Market, 329 P.2d 638 
(Kan. 1958) in support of the proposition that the Kan-
~as statute which sets the markup of retailers at six per-
cent in the absence of proof of lesser cost, ·was not arbi-
trary, unreasonable or discriminatory. The Kansas 
statute in question in that case, as quoted by the court, 
provides: 
"It is here by declared that any advertising, offer 
to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by re-
tailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as de-
fined in this act, with the intent of unfairly di-
verting trade from a competitor or otherwise in-
juring a competitor, impair and prevent fair com-
petition, injure public welfare, are unfair compe-
tition and contrary to public policy and the pol-
icy of this act, 'where the result of such advertis-
ing, off er or sale is to tend to deceive any pur-
chaser or prospective purchaser, or to substan-
tially lessen competition, or to unreasonably re-
sfrain trade, or to tencl to creaite a monopoly in 
any line of commerce.'' State v. Consumer's Ware-
house Market, supra, at 640-641. (Emphasis 
added.) 
It should be noted that the italicized portion of this Act 
is different from the Utah Act, ·which speaks of "intent 
and purpose" and does not speak of result. The action 
in Consumer's lVarehousr Market arose on a motion 
to quash the information 011 the grounds that the statute 
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1ntc; uneonstitntional. Hence, there was no trial \vith 
introduction of evidence. On appeal, the case was based 
upon the information and the motion to quash filed by 
defeuda11t. Defe11clant asserted that the statute was in 
1'iolation of the Fourtee11th Amendment in that it violat-
ccl clue process and equal protection. The court makes a 
lengthy argument going along the N ebbia v. New Yark 
line upholding the authority of legislatures to pass such 
acts. Dcf enclant herein does not challenge the authority 
of the legislature to pass such an act. 'What defendant is 
challenging is the method and the reasonableness of the 
a pplica ti on of the Act. As to the unreasonableness and 
nrhitrariness of the Act, it should be noted that in Con-
sumer's TT' arclwuse JJ!arket no evidence on these points 
\\':ts introclucecl. In the case at bar there is ample evi-
cleHce as to the unreasonableness and arbitrariness of 
the application of the Act. 
It should be fnrther noted that the statute involved 
m Cm1s11111er's nrurcl1011se "~1arket contained a prima 
fa.cie evidene0 provision, rather than a presumption such 
a8 is coutained in the Utah Act. The distinction between 
a J!ri111a facie evillcnce pro1-ision and a presumption is 
ll(l('quately explained in IX "\Vigmore on Evidence §§2490-
2-!'. l-± ( 3c1 eel. 1940) a11d must be considered when reading 
thl'fH.; cases. \Vith respect to the prima facie provi-
c;i011s of the Kansas Act, defendant challenged them as 
hei11g unconstitutional and shifting the burden of proof. 
rrlw court expressly did not set forth its views as to the 
t'onstitutionality of this provision since it felt such ques-
t ion was not raised by a motion to quash. 
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In support of the proposition that "In California 
a provision which allows a presum1Jtion of i11tc11t from 
the mere sale below cost, without a limitation of supply, 
has been held valid,'' interYenor-appellant cites People 
v. Payless Drug Stores, 153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944), and 
Mering v. Yolo Grocery & J.lfeat Market, 127 P.2d 985 
(Calif. 1942). These cases do not support the statement 
for which they are cited. These cases do not hold that a 
mere sale below cost may result in a valid presumption. 
Repeatedly, on pages 12, 13 and 14 of the Payless opin-
ion, the court makes statements like: 
Section 5 provides that in all actions brought un-
der the provisions of the statute the proof of one 
or more acts of selling below cost, together ivith 
proof of the injurious effect of such acts, "shall 
be presumptive evidence of the purpose or inte11t 
to injure competitors or destroy competition.'' 
Proof of injurious effect is permitted to be shown 
with the proof of sales below cost as a presump-
tive or prima facie <>vidence that the requisite 
intent existed. 
The Legislature merely enacted into law what is 
common in human experience, that when a person 
causes injuries by his acts he should be deemed to 
intend such consequences unless he can excuse 
or explain his conduct by facts showing that he 
had an innocent intent. (Emphasis added) 
Similar statements are found in the Mering opinion at 
page 9~9. 
From all of these quotations it will be noted that 
the California Act iu addition to providing the presump-
tion from the sale below eost, requires that i11i11ry he 
shown. The Utah Act makes no sneh n'qnirement am1, ill 
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fad eliminates suC'h a requirement. Utah Code Ann. ~13-
:J-lJ (Repl. \·ol. 1962). No evidence was presented in 
the case at bar that any injury had occurred. Hence, 
the Utah presumption is much stronger than the one in 
the California case cited by appellants. 
Iu their arguments, appellants seem to vascilate be-
t\\een an argument that the statute requires reasonable-
11ess and an argument that difficulty in application of a 
f-:tatute is no reason for its its invalidation. It is sub-
mitted that these are not distinct and different argu-
ments. The standard of reasonableness as set forth in 
the many cases cited by appellants may ·well be based 
upon difficulty of application. See Broadbent v. Gibson, 
s111Jra. \Vhat is the standard of reasonableness ·when de-
fi11ecl in more explicit terms? This standard would seem 
to be that which the normal, average, reasonable busi-
lH:.'ssman could be expected to do. If, in its application, 
a statute becomes so difficult that a normal, reasonable, 
,,,·erage businessman could not be expected to comply, 
thrn the Rtatute has failed the test of reasonability. There 
are numerous casPs holding that unreasonable arbitrary 
statutes should Hot be upheld. Upon close reading of 
tlwRe caRes, it will be obserw>d that in many of them the 
reason for the court's holding that such statutes are un-
reasonable and arbitrary is that they are difficult or im-
possibie to apply. E.g. Broarlbent v. Gibson, supra. In-
tene11or-appellant 's citations to W. F. Jensen Candy 
('()1111mny v. State Tax Commission, 61 P.2d 629 (Utah 
l!l36) and Robert ll. Hinckley, Inc. v. Statr Tax Com-
rnissio11, 404 P.2d 662 (Utah 1965) are entirely inappo-
site. Both of these cases i1wolved the collection and re-
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mittance of sales tax. ln neither of th0 <·ases was there 
any contention that the taxpayer cou1cl 110t determine 
the amount of sales tax due. r:.L1 he only eonte11tio11 in both 
of the cases was that due to the bracket system of col-
lecting the tax, taxpayer could not collect the tax from 
his purchasers, yet he had to remit the tax to the state. 
All taxpayer had to do in either case to figure the tax 
due was to take his gross sales times the percentage of 
tax. This is no problem. There was no question of rea-
sonability. Taxpayers knew the amount of the tax, and 
they knew the exact amount of their sales. 
The cases cited by intervenor-appellant on page 23 
m support of its proposition that sale below cost stat-
utes haw been upheld despite mere difficulty of applica-
tion do not support this proposition. People -v. Kahn, 60 
P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936), was a criminal case in which de-
fendant was convicted on a plea of guilty. Therefore, 
there was no evidence before the court at all as to diffi-
culty of application of statutory standards. 
On pages 24 and 25 of its brief, intenenor-appe1-
lant equates cost computation under the sale below cost 
statutes to cost computations for profit and loss statr-
ments. This is really not an equation. Cost computa-
tions for profit and loss purposes are made after the 
fact. No one will contest the fact that accurate cost 
computations can be made after sales. At the end of 
the year it is not difficult to arriYe at a reasonable profit 
and loss statement for the transactions which occurred 
in the preceding year. Howeyer, it ~would be entirely un-
reasonable to arrive at a profit and loss statement at t11e 
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111·!..'.·in11i11g of tht> year for the futnre year. This is 'drnt 
tl1is statute, in fact, requires. It requires the merchant 
at his lH'ril to price his goocls prior to the time he sells 
them, prior to the time he eYen pays for them in many 
case:,; ancl 1wior to the time he receiYes mam- rebates . ' 
discounts ancl free goods. The trial court found this to 
be uureasonable. 
POINT 2 
THE STATUTORY PRESlDIPTION OF PER-
CENTAGE YARKUP PRESENT IN THE 
ACT "WITH ITS CRIMINAL SANCTIONS UN-
CONSTITUTIONALLY GIVES THE BURDEN 
OF PROOF TO DEFENDANTS. 
Section 13-5-14 of the Utah lTnfair Practices Act 
pro\·icles for iujunctin relief, and damages. Section 
18-3-13 Iffo,·ides a criminal penalty for violations of the 
Act. It will be noted from a reading of the Act that the 
prcn·isi011 for i11jm1cti,-e relief, the damages proYisions 
and the criminal proYisions are based upon the same 
statutory violation. The same operative facts consti-
tnte a case no matter whether brought as a criminal 
action, a riYil case for damages, or a ci\'il injunctiYe case. 
The ;.;ame definitious of cost apply; the same 67a pre-
sumption applies; and the same definition of intent and 
purpose is applied. The same defenses are a\-ailable, and 
the :,;ame definition of replacement cost applies. The 
presumption raised by Section 13-5-9(2) from proof of 
limitation applies whether the prosecution be civil or 
('riminal. Under this statute, the only difference between 
a ciYil case and a criminal action is the form of the ac-
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tion. There is absolutely no reason ·why the court shou1(1 
not consider the criminal provisions of this Art. It is 
obvious tha,t the civil provisions of this Act cannot he 
held unconstitutional without perforce holding the 
criminal provisions unconstitutional also. Accord, State 
ex. rel. Auders<m v. Fleming Co., :~339 P. 2d 12, 18 (Kan. 
1959). See Pride Oil Co. v. Salt Lake Co1111ty, 370 P.2d 
:i55, 357 (Utah 1962). On this point, intervenor-appel-
lant cites State Y. Barlow, 153 P.2d 647 (Utah 1944), ap-
pPal dismissed 324 U.S. 829, rehearing denied, 324 U.S. 
891 (1945). The Barlow case is the Utah polygamy cas(• 
and contains many issues. In the lower court thr de-
fondm1ts vv0re convicted and ·were arguing· that a por-
tion of the Act under which they ·were convicted was un-
constitutional. The court he kl that that portion umlcr 
which they were convicted was severable and therefore 
could be enforced. In dictum the court stated: 
No other part of the statute was invoked in the 
trial of these cases, hence appellants have no 
standing to question their validity. State v. Bar-
low, supra, at 655. 
This case is no antliorit~· for a holding that this court 
cannot consider the criminal penalties inYolvec1 iu thP 
case now before the court. 8ee HeJ1rie v. Rocky Mfl!. 
Packing Corp., 202 P. 2cl 727 (Utah 1949). Defendants 
have stipulated to a set of fads which clearly put them 
in vi.olation of the criminal statute>. The fact that 110 
criminal action has ~-et been brought should not lw ck-
terminafrn' of ·whether 01· 110t the court considers these 
sanctions. ln State v. Flc111i119, supra, thP court holds: 
It is eh-mental that a niminal statute must he 
d0finite. f ritation omittP<l]. Neither doPs the fad 
that this is a civil suit and not a criminal action 
help the statute enough to make it valid. We 
1rn11ld read tliis statutr as a U"hole. (Emphasis 
added.) State ex rel. AndPrson v. Flemin.g Co., 
suvra at 18. 
The e\Tide11ce presented in the trial of this case applies 
equally as well to the civil and criminal penalties. The 
trial court had adequate evidence on which to base its 
firnling that the presumption unconstitutionally shifts the 
burden of proof to defendants. Henrie v. Rocky Mtn. 
Packing Corp., 196 P.2d 487, (Utah 1948); rrhearing 202 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1949). 
The 6% presumption found in the statute was placed 
there as an aid to the prosecutor or to the plaintiff. These 
presumptions are generally put in statutes where the evi-
dence to prove a fact is much more available to the de-
fendant than to the prosecutor. Requiring a defendant 
to go forward and rebut the presumption, hence, is not 
deemed to lw too great a burden in many cases. In Mor-
riso 11 \'. California, 291 U.S. 82, 88-89 (1934), the United 
States flupreme Court announced the test for a per-
missible presumption where it stated that: 
rrr]he state shall have proved enough to make it 
just for the defendant to be required to repel 
wliat has been proved \vith Pxcuse or explanation, 
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience 
or of the opportunities for knowledge thr shifting 
of tl1e b11rdc11 u.·ill be fou11d to be an aid to the 
acrnser without :;11bjecti11g the accused to hard-
sli ip or 0111;ressio11. (Emphasis added.) 
.1crnrd, C:reat Atlantic & Pacific Tra Co. v. Errin, 23 F. 
Nu pp. 70, 82 (D. 2\fom. l!l38). 
This is the kst that should he applied in this case. 
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vVhether or not tlw presumption places too great 
a hardship or oppression upon the accused is depend-
t>nt upon the nature of the presumption. The presump-
tion in the instant case, that cost i11 the absence of proof 
of a lesser cost shall he 6%, in fact is an irrelmttable 
presumption. The court found, and thE' evidence amply 
sustains th0 finding, that defendants in many cases can-
not compute an exact cost for any item. Since defend-
ants cannot compute a ''lesser cost,'' or even a greater 
eost, the presumption provided by the statute would pre-
vail. The following possible sequence of events will 
illustrate: 
1. Defendant is charged with a \'iolation of a sale 
below cost statute based on a sale of aspirin at 55¢. 
2. At the time of priei11g this aspirin for sale, de-
fendant did not know its actnal cost due to discounts 
not yet received and various non-alloeahle costs involved 
m merchandising. 
3. Defendant cannot pnn-e a lesser cost and, as a 
matter of fact, cannot prove a cost at all for the par-
tieular item. Even if it could, this would he an after-
the-fact determination and would not help it set the 
original price for which it has already sold the aspirin. 
4. In the absence of proof of a lesser cost, the cost is 
cleemecl to he 61r above invoice cost. 
5. Defendant is convict eel of selling under invoice 
cost plus 67; hasod upon the stre11gth of the presumption 
alone. 
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Genc'rall)· speaki11g, presumptions shift only the bur-
den of going forward with the evidence and do not 
shift the lmrden of proof. However, if a presumption 
is to shift only the burden of going forward with the 
c,·ide11ce, there must be some possibility of going for-
ward with the evidence. Since in this case the court 
fonml that it ·was in many cases impossible for defend-
ants to "go forward with the evidence," the presump-
1 ion becomes conclusive. Similar statutory provisions 
han• het•11 held unconstitutional as shifting to the de-
frllCla nt the burden of proving his innocence. Mott's Su-
1wr :llarkets, Inc. Y. Frassinelli, 172 A. 2d 381 (Conn. 
HJ61); Wiley \'.Sampson-Ripley Co., 120 A. 2d 289 (l\Ie. 
1~):)6); Oreat Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. 
Snpp. 70 (D. l\fom. 1938). See also discussion of the 
affect of this presumption under Point 1, supra. 
(
1onsicleri11g the lower conrt holding thait the 6% pre-
~unq1tio11 shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and 
is lie!ll'l' mwo11stitutio11al, it should be iwted in answer 
to appellant's nrgument at pages 30 and 31 of its brief, 
that <lefemlants admit that a rebuttable presumption 
<10<'8 iwt shift the bnrden of proof but merely shifts 
1 lie lmnkn of going forward with the evidence. How-
ever, as stated previously, the 6% presumption, to which 
the' court found there vrns no alternative, is not a rebut-
tnhlr presumption but is a conclusive presumption. Since 
t lie presumption becomes conclusive, it not only shifts 
the lmrclrn of going forward but shifts the burden of 
proof. 
.At pages 31-32 of its brief, intervenor-appellant states 
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that, "the state has the burden of proving a Yiolation [of 
the 67o statute] before the defendant is required to 
make any explanation." This statement is not borne out 
by the record. Mr. Gordon Browning, Executive Secre-
tary of the Trade Commission, when asked about the 
Trade Commission enforcement procedure and how he 
would find a sale below cost, stated: 
Basically it is to find out exactly as to the com-
plaint, and then to find a price, a low price, which 
I would either contact one of the big wholesalers 
or someone who buys in great quantities, and too 
low to sell people at, they are at the wholesale 
level, and I would get their price, plus the 6% of 
their lead in cost, then I would have to use that 
as a barometer to establish a low price. (R. 122-
123) 
·when further questioned as to how he dete,rmined the 
element of intent, Mr. Browning stated 
Well, the fact that there £s a legal price would in-
dicate to me that it could lw intended, if it is be-
low the legal price, and a person knows it is belo"· 
the legal price. I would have to think tha,t this, in 
my mind, would be intention. ( R. 124) (Emphasis 
added.) 
From the above it appears that in its enforcement pro-
cedure, the Trade Commission is making a presumption of 
intent which is not allowed by the statute and which, in 
fact, places the burden of proof initially upon the de-
fendant by reason of the presumption. The presumption 
being conclusive in its application does shift the burden 
of proof rather than the hnnlen of C'Orning forward to 
defendants, since defendants, in fact, C'annot come 
forward. 
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In snpport of the proposition that a preseumption 
as to cost, in the absence of a showing of lesser cost, has 
been liehl to not unconstitutionally shift the burden of 
proof to the dcf endant, intervenor-appellant cites Mc-
Rllumr v. Geror, 292 N.vV. 414, (Minn. 1940). The fac-
tual background of this case should be brought out. This 
\\'as a11 appeal from au order overruling defendant's de-
mnrrer to the complaint. The trial court certified the 
<1nestio11 as important and doubtful and from this cer-
tification defendant was allowed to appeal. There was 
110 trial of the facts. The .Minnesota statute involved 
in this case prohibited all sales "at less than the cost 
thereof ... for the purpose of amd with the effect of in-
j11ri11g competitors and destroying competition." It 
~-l10nlcl he 11otecl that at page 418 the court, in defining 
cost, states: 
Two eleme11ts comprise cost - actual outlay 
for goods and the expense of doing business. The 
la1Ner is defined in Mason's Minn. St. 1940 
Supp ~ 3976-42, as "all current costs of doing 
busi11ess ... '' '' r:L'he cost for the 12 month period 
i111111erliately prccedi'llg or a shorter time if the 
business is less than a year old, is made prirna 
f acie evidence of current costs." (Emphasis 
adde(l.) 
'rhis statement is nr:T interesting in that it shows how 
this statute was set up to au after-the-fact method of 
ncf'ouutiug iu order to project future costs. As to the 
Pffieacy of this case for the purpose cited, the following 
q notp is essential, at page 419: 
All this section adds is the declaration tha:t 
10'.lc of list price is prirna facie evidence of cost 
of doing business. Iu order to say that the infer-
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rnce permitted is un\varranted, ,,.e must sav that 
there is no rational com1ectiou beh\·een th~ em-
rent cost of Joing lmsinoss and 10~;{) of the in-
voice price. TVe do 11ot hare the facts and cannot 
so hold. (Emphasis added.) 
Hence, the court is saying that it did not luwe before 
it in this case the facts to make a determination as to 
whether this presumption as to the cost was in fact un-
constitutional. \Vithout such evidence, the court has no 
choice but to uphold the constitutionality of the statute. 
At page 37 of its brief, intenenor-appellant eites 
State, .. Eau Claire Oil Co., 151 N.W. 2d 634 C\Visc. 1967) 
as being in accord with People Y. Payless Drug Stores, 
153 P.2d 9 (Calif. 1944). The giRt of the proposition for 
which this case is eited as support is that after proof of 
a sale belmv cost and an injury resulting from Rnch sale, 
it is not an undue hardship to place upon the defendant 
the responsibility to come forward with the evidence of 
its true intent as against the prima facie showing. To 
begin with, it should be iwted that both of the abon-citcd 
eases require a sale below cost and a11 injury resulting 
therefrom. The Utah statute requires no such evidence 
of injury and in the case at bar no proof or evidence 
was offered by the State as to any injury resulting from 
a sale below cost. As in the previous cases, it should be 
noted that there was no trial upon the facts, no stipula-
tion, and there was no evidence taken in the Eau Claire 
case. The definition of cost as set forth by the court at 
page 637 appears to he exactly the same as that in the 
Utah Act. The rest of the Act appears to be substan 
tially the same as the Utah Act, cxeept for the fact that 
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tliis statute contains a prima facie eYidence prons10n 
\\·i 1 h respect to intent in addition to the presumption as 
to cost. This court held that there is a rational connec-
tion between the prima far:ie provision in the statute, e.g.: 
... "evidence of any advertisement, offer to sell, 
the sale of any merchandise by any retailer or 
wholesaler at less than cost as defined in this sec-
tion shall be prim.a f acie evidence of intent to in-
duce the purchaser of other merchandise, or to 
unfairly divert trade from a competitor, or to 
0 1therwise injure a competitor.'' 
arnl the intent requirement of the Ac1t. The· court was 
11of commenting upon the presumption contained in the 
stautc in audition to the prima facie evidence provision. 
It was construing the prima facie evidence provision. In 
effect, the court holds that it is rational to assume from 
e\'idence of sale below cost and a resulting injury that 
there is an intent to injure competitors. The court does 
not hold that it is rational to presume a cost of doing 
hnsiuess of '' X'' amount. The court expressly found in the 
ease at bar that there is not a rational connection be-
twPen the fact presumed and the facts upon which the 
pn•:·mmption is based. 
POINT 3 
THE STATU'rORY PRESUl\f PTION OF PER-
CENTAGE l\IARKUP Al\IOUNTS TO AN UN-
CONSTITUTIONAL PRICE FIXING BY THE 
LEGISLATURE IN THAT THE ALTERNA-
TIVE TO THE PRESUl\IPTION, THAT OF 
PROVING A LESSER ACTUAL COST, IS 
NOT A REAL ALTERNA'l'IVE BECAUSE IT 
IS IN ALL CASES IMPRACTICAL AND IN 
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:MANY GASES DIPOSSIBLFi TO PROVE 
THE ACTUAL COST OF A PARTICULAR 
ITE'.\[ 01'' l\IFJRCHANDISE SOLD IN THE 
TYPE OF R];jTAIL OPERATIONS CUSTOM-
ARILY CONDUCTED B\r RETAIL l\IER-
C'HAXTS SUCH AS D]JFENDANTS. 
The finding of the trial court that in many eases 
proof of actual cost is impossible is amply supported hy 
the evidence. There was testimony by the comptroller 
of defendant Grauel Central that it does not refine its 
costs to a per-item basis. There ~was expert testimony 
that such refinement ,,·ortld 11ot be feasihk'. Since cost 
cannot be feasibly refined to a per-item basis, it becomes 
impossible to com<' up with a "lesser cost" tha11 the in-
voice cost plus 6j{ 11rovided Ji~- the statute. Standard 
StorPs Y. Safeway Stores, luc., 195fi Trade Cases 1T 68, 153 
(D. Colo. 1955). Because it is impossible to come up 
with a lesser cost (or any other cost) a retailer must ar-
bitrarily acld to his invoice or replacement cost the statu-
tory 61/c. By requiring all retailern to arbitrarily add 
to their im-oieo or replarement costs the st<1tntory 6)1c, 
the sfatute, in fact, fixos prices at im-oiee cost plus the 
statutory 6%. Generally speaking, for stores in the same 
size e<1tegory, the im·oiee price will lie the same. _FJyen 
the smaller store's, as was testified by :'.\[r. Sorenson of 
Associated Grocers, ma~- partake of this lesser cost by 
joining an association arnl lmyi11g in volume through tlw 
association. (R. 147-14-8) The statute, through its pre-
sumption of 6%, which cannot he rebutted, unconstitu-
tiorn1lly Hllows price fixing· in contraYC11tio11 of Artirk 
XII, Sectio11 20 of thl' Utah Constitntio11. 
As ably state(l hy this conrt in the case of Pride Oil 
( 'u. v. Salt LakP Co1111ty, 370 P.2d 355, 337 (Utah 1962) : 
One of the basic tenets of our system is that free 
and open competition is a >vl1ol~some, stimulating 
force in our economy. Our founding fathers rec-
ognized this and so indicated in our constitution; 
r citing Section 20, Article XII, Utah Constitu-
tion] which is also implemented in our statutes. 
f citing Section 50-1-1 Utah Code Ann. 1953.] 
In the abon-citecl case the court held the provisions 
of the :'.\Iotor Vehicle Code requiring posting of gasoline 
prices to he unconstitutional. It is significant to note 
that in the Pride case this court took notice of whether 
or not the ac;tivity which the statute intended to control 
.so serious];' affeced the public interest as to justify the 
measures proposed for correction. The court stated at 
page 356: 
The sccollCl and more important one is that we 
:-:.;0e no real likelihood that the restrictions they 
place 011 the size and location of signs would ma-
terially aid in policing and preventing deception 
of the public. 
Tlw court then goes into the purposes of the sfatute and 
states that the argument that these statutes are neces-
,-;ary to prevent deceptive advertising is "something less 
1 han candid.'' Such abuses, the court stated, have been 
prnscrilwcl for many y0ars 11;' 
Onr siatnte whirh denounces false and deceptive 
advertising [ ritatiom; omitted]. From the record of 
the hearing hcforc the trial court, it is evident 
that this \YHS not the only motivation behind the 
statutes in question. Tliei"°r 11assagc by the legisla-
ture 1rns s11011sorcd l;y the i1derrcnors, the Utah 
.1ssociatio11 of Petroleum Dealers. From the testi-
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mony of their ,,-itnesses, it is plni11ly nirleJ1t tlwt 
a rcry i111 porfa11t cn11sideratio11 prompti11g sup-
port of this legislation 1cas to control gas price 
1cars. PrirlP Oil Co. Y. Salt LakP County, s11pra at 
3.31. (Emphasis acldecl.) 
Quoting further from the court: 
Despite a,·erments and innuendos to the ef-
feet that the latter [gas wars] are in the long run 
inimical to the puhlic interest, ice ore not c011-
ri11cerl that they pose Oil!f such da11per to the pul1-
lic as slio11lr11carra11t inrnsio11 of the constitution-
al riglits of tlie co111plaiJ1i11.r; rlcalers. Pride Oil Co. 
Y. Salt Lake County, .'lllira. (Empha-.;i,;: a(1decl.) 
Based upon the reas0ni11g of the court in the Pri1le Oil 
case, it is not improper for the, cnnrt in thi" ca,;:e to lo(Jk 
into the purpo,;:es of the statute and it-.; effect i11 fact. 
rather than ju,;:t going along with the statt,c1 purpo-.;es of 
the statute. 
Like the statute m the Pride Oil cast-. the statute 
i1n-oh-ed iu the pre,;:ent case i-.; also in fact a price-fiC1:i11z 
statute and. as such. is ,-inbtiw of _\rticlt> XII. St>ctiou 
:20 of the rtah Constituti•111. In the ca-.;c of (;01,1111 11/i 1. 
FedPraferl Jlilk Producers A . .:..~u .. Inc .. 3ti0 P.:2d 101~ 
(rtah 1961). this court held that SectiPn Hl-_.\.. of the 
l~niform _.\..gricultnral Cooperatiw _.\..ssociation _.\..ct did 
not permit associations to control prices in ,-iolation 
of the Constitution. In so lwldimt. thi~ court ,;:tateL1 tl1at 
an agreement bet\\·et·n nwrnl ,ers of a cooperatin' as~ocia­
tion to fu minimum prices for ,,-Jiil'l1 milk was tu he 
sold \n1S Yiolatfre of _.\..rticle XII. Section ~Cl of the Con-
stitution. The si!!11ificant pn rt (1f this <«lSl' is it" uplwhl-
in~· nrnl r1uoting from the prior case of General Electric 
Co.,._ T/1rifty Sales, Inc., 301 P.2d 741, 748 (Utah 1956). 
In the General Electric case, this court held the 
nah Fair Trade ..:\ct to he an iirrnlicl price fixing in vio-
lati<rn of ~\rticle XII, Section 20 of the Constitution. 
The conrt stated: 
'J'he f ecleral anti-trust laws ·were only acts of Con-
gress, which may readily be modified by subse-
quent enactments; whereas our anti-price-fixing 
pro\·ision is in our Constitution, which must pre-
,·ail o\·er an~- statutory enactment inconsistent 
therewith, ho1cecer laudable or desirable, or hou·-
erer 1rise or eu0 11 neu',ssary for the public welfare 
such legislation may seem. General Electric Co. 
'. Thrifty Sales, Inc., supra. (Emphasis added.) 
Further considering the Fair Trade Act, the court 
went into an extensi\·e discussion of the intent and pur-
pose of the Fair Trade Act and then a discussion as to 
\d1etlwr the Fair Trade Act accomplished the purpose 
claimed for it. Discussing the arguments existing on 
hoth sides, the court, at page 749, states that: 
It is also plansably argued that instead of 
1Jeing a boon to small retailers as plaintiff argues, 
the Fair Trade Act is actually detrimental to them 
iu that it prennts them from getting ahead by 
efficient operation. That is, by assuring price and 
profit, it encourages additional retailers to enter 
the field, spreading the income thinner among 
<lealers. It is reasoned that the public should not 
liace to bear tlir additional cost of supporting 
more retailers, but if business grai·itates to more 
efficie11t 011es zclw can sell at lo1Cer prices, the 
LJ.117Jlic should hare tlze benefits of this efficiency. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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Further, the court states 
The difficulty 1l'ith the ty1Je of "11rice fix-
ing" here in question, ere11 if it lt'ere for the salu-
tary purposes contended by the plaintiff, whether 
it be a little or a lot, is that it is a 1·iolation of our 
Constitutio11. It is like sin, a little sin, if properly 
so classified, is just as definitely sin as a great 
quantity of it, and hardly to be apprond under 
t.he pretext that it is so small an amount that it 
can really be regarded as virtue. 
Although \\'e are aware of the fact that all 
doubt should be resolYed in favor of constitution-
ality [citations omitted], it nen~rthcless appears 
from the interdiction agamst a11y ''combination 
... having for its object or effect the co11trnlli11g 
of the price . . . of any article of manufac-
ture ... " that the framers simply did not want 
price fixing by any combination. TV e see 110 rea-
son which would im1;cl us to ignore nor to rnry 
from the plaii,n import of the 1.cords of the Consti-
tution [citation omitted], evcn though events may 
have occurred which prohabl~, were not foresee11 
at the time the provision was adopted. r citations 
omitted.] l:Ve do 11ot regard tlte situation here 
presented as inrnfring the regulation of prices 
where the public health, morals or welfarP may be 
affected and the question of legislative police jJOlf'-
er under such circumstances is 11ot here dealt zritli. 
General Electric Co. v. Thrifty Sales, Ilic., supra. 
ait 751-752. (Emphasis added.) 
From the above-cited cases nnd the quotatio11s there-
from, it will be seen that this court has, in fad, consi<l-
ered cases under Article XII, Seetiou 20 of the Co11stitu-
tion. In so consideriug these cases, the court has not 
been hesitant to look at the real purpose> of the :-;tatntr, 
aside from the lcgislatiYcl)'-statc<l purpo:-10. 1'po11 tl1i:' 
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antl10rity, the court is not precluc1ccl from looking into 
1h<• real pnrpose and effect of the sale-below-cost statute. 
rt is :c;ubmittetl that the lower court's finding that this 
statut8 is a priec-fixing statute and violative of the Con-
:-:1itution is based upon the e\'iclence adduced at the trial 
ot' tlie matter and is elearly supported by such evidence. 
[t should also be 11oted that the federal government has 
rnnsidered this question and concluded that persons join-
ing together, such as intervenor-appellants' members in 
tli<' case at bar, to seek enforcement of sale below cost 
aeits arc iu violation of Sherman Act price maintenance 
prn\'isions. [T. S. v. Co11nccfic11t Food Council, foe., 1940-
1943 Trm1e Cases. 1FiG,167 (D. Conn. 1941); U.S. v. Mas-
so.rl1Usctts Food Co1111c·il, 1940-1943 Trade Cases 1156,165 
(P. '\fass. El41); [!. S. v. Rhode Island Food Council, 
luc., HJ40-1043 Tradt> Cases 1156,175 (D.R. I. 1941). 
At page 32 of its hrid, intenenor-appellant com-
m0nces its argument that the Utah Constitution, Article 
XII, Ser:tiou 20, does not prohil)it the sale below cost act 
as pricP fixing. In support of this proposition, inter-
1·enor-a prw llan t ci tcs R iggi11s v. District Court, 51 P .2d 
G4-;) (Utah 1935). A close reading of this case will dis-
clo.<;<' Uiat it has nothing to do with price fixing. This 
<'ase was a test of the state lir1uor control lavvs. The 
eonrt hel<l that th2 state can be in the liquor business and 
not lw in violation of this statute. It should be noted that 
there was no facrtual development in an adversary-type 
lirnring. 
At page 33 of its brief, intervcuor-appellant, in sup-
port of the proposition that the Unfair Practic·es Act is 
not a price-fixing measure, cites Burt v. lT'ools11late, foe., 
146 P.2d 203 (Utah 1944). In that case, plaintiff was 
suing defendant for breach of contract and defendant 
was basing its defense upon the Fair 'l'rade Act and the 
Unfair Practices Act. Defendant was in essence say-
ing that since it ·was selling its product at $37.50 per ton 
to everyone else, a contract to sell at $32.50 per ton to 
plaintiff was void under the Act. It should be noted that ' 
the portion of the Act involved there was the Anti-dis- , 
crimination Section or the Little-Robinson-Pa.tman Act. 
The court held that such a defense could not be made 
upon the basis of the Act. Hence, any language purport-
ing to discuss the Act is purely dictum. It should also 
be noted that the court in Burt made much of the fact 
that the case had not been adequately briefed and argued 
and that many points had not been raised in the brief 
which should have been raised. 'l'he case was remande<l 
for trial on the facts with relation to the contracit, 8ince 
there was some problem with the trial court's interpre-
tation of the contract. The Burt case did not bring into 
question the constitutionality of the Unfair Practices 
Act. The only question was 'vhether or not the defendant 
would, by honoring the contract, violate the Act and the ' 
court held that the defendant could not use the Act as , 
a defense. 
Intervenor-appellant further cites in support of this 
proposition Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. Na-
tional Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2d 3, (Calif. 1938). The 
facts of this case are distinguished infra. Ho"-ever, it 
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slwul(l he 110ted that there was not a hearing on the 
merits in the cast>. The case came up on defendant's 
aclmissio11s to ,-iolations of the Act. In response to the 
argument that the court should not go behind the pur-
pose of the statute as stated by the Legislature, the court 
~tated: 
In the first place, mere sincerity or honesty 
of purpose on the part of the legislature does not 
alone justify the statute. The declaration in the 
statute as to its purposes, does not determine 
1chether the means provided in the statute are rea-
sonably designed to accomplish those purposes. 
The courts may properly inquire into the subject. 
lVholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. National 
Carndy & Tobarco Co., supra, at 11. (Emphasis 
added.) 
This case clearly supports the authority of the trial 
court to make the findings made. 
It should be noted that the objections made to the 
:-,tatute involved in Wholesale Tobacco Dealers were that 
it was in violation of the due process and equal protec-
tion clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. As far as 
the case states, there was no objection as to any viola-
tion of any California constitutional provision such as 
Article XII, Section 20 of the Utah Constitution. At page 
15 the court states: 
In its true sense, it [the Aci] is not a price-fixing 
statute at all. It merely fixes a level below which 
the producer or distributor may not sell with in-
tent to injure a competitor. (Emphasis added.) 
But while the comt makes the above statement, all 
' 
of the cases it cites supporting the action of the Califor-
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ma legislature were price-fixing cases, cases which up-
held the right of a state to fix minimum prices under its 
police power. 
In General Electric v. Tltrifty Sales, s111Jra, the Utah 
Supreme Court helcl the Utah Fair Trade Act to be un-
constitutional as a price-fixing statute. That statute it-
self did not fix prices. The court found that the eff'ect of 
the statute was to fix prices. The trial court in the ill-
stant case concluded that the effect of the Unfair Prac-
tices Act is to fix prices. Such being its effect, the Un-
fair Practices Act also violates Article XII, Section 20 
of the Utah Constitution. 
Intervenor-appellant argues that the statutor~- 6~~ 
presumption is not a price-fixing statute, but is in fact 
an aid to the retailer. This position goes contrary to 
the general purposes of presumptions in all statutes as 
set forth above i11 Point 2. The reason for haYing a 
presumption is to aid the plaintiff or the prosecution 
where the facts are not rea<lily anlilahle to them. The 
presumption in fact put::-; a burden upon the clef enclant 
to go forward with the eYicknce, which burden he ~would 
otherwise no{ haw. Hence, it is quite difficult to say 
that the presumption in this ease aids the defendants. 
Intervenor-appellant further likens this presump-
tion to the 1070 standarcl deduction fll'Ovisions in Fc<1-
era1 and state income tax laws. This analogy is com-
pletel~- inapposite. Both FP<krnl arnl stak income tax 
laws allow a 10% stauuard deduction in place of an 
it<>mizNl deduction. Howeyer, it will be noted that 
uwlcr .b~elleral and state income tax laws, it is possible 
to keep records and itemize your deductions. This itemi-
zD tiou is an after-the-fact computation which is not at all 
Jiffienlt. Hence, there is a reasonable alternative to the 
lO~lr standard deuucition. It should also be noted that 
tlie 10% standard deduction does not involve any pre-
sumptions. A taxpayer need not even take the 10% 
standard deduction if he does uot wish to take it. He 
,,·ill not he prosecutecl for a crime nor will he be sued for 
damages. Under tax laws, at the end of the year a per-
:-:011 can sit down with his books and records and deter-
mine exactly what he has spent for various items. In 
contrast, the 6% statute would require a person to sit 
<low11 before he sells an item, before he incurs rents, be-
fore he pays his light bill, before he pays wages, and oth-
er overhead expenses, and allocate to each bottle of 
aspirin that he sells a specific portion of each of these 
exrwn:-:cs. The record keeping required for tax purposes 
is not burdensome and not impractical because it is an 
nftp1·-the-fact record keeping system. It is submitted 
that this is the exact system upon which defendants op-
Pratt-. TlH' court has found that operating under this 
s~·:-:tern, the 6% presumption pro,·ides no alternatives to 
tlwse dPfcndants since they eannot prove a lesser cost. 
Iutenenor-appellant argues that the court misin-
terpreted the statutory term "cost" as requiring an 
l'Xact standard. Iuknenor-appellant cites the case of 
Hol.2:er v. Caler, 74 P.2d 839 (Calif. 1938) as being a 
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case holding the statute invalid as requiring a showing of 
exact cost. A reading of the cat-Jc cited by internnor-
appellant reveals that this was not tho holding of the 
lower court in the case. This case does not discnss a 
showing· of exact cost. In fact, this case ·was decided 
upon an eviclentiary question and all of the talk in the 
case ·with respccit to the constitutional questions is dictum. 
The California Supreme Court affirmed the case based 
upon evidcntiary facts and held that it did not need to 
reach a constitutional questio11. Balzer v. Caler, 82 P2d. 
19 (Calif. 1938). 
In further support of its proposition that an exact 
showing of cost neeJ not 1Je made, i11ten-enor-appella11t 
next cites People v. Payless Drug Stores, 153 P.2d ~J 
(Calif. 1944). Intervenor-appellant is entirely incorrect 
in citing this case for the proposition "cost" means a 
figure arri,-ed at by reasonable accounting methods. 
The court in this case held that the factual back-
ground for determining the constitntimrnlity of the co8t 
provision was not presented a11cl hence could not be de-
cided. People v. Payless Drug Stores, s11pra, at H,-15. In 
neither the Payless case nor the Trholesale Tobacco 
Dealers case relied upon hy intencnor-appellant was 
the factual presentation sufticie11t to allow a decision on 
this issue. Therefore, the holcling contended by inter-
venor-appellant for these eases is not i11 fact the holding. 
The eourt in People Y. Payless Drug Stores, supra, at 
page 15, states: 
[A]ny difficulty in computing- eost is a factual one, 
aml statutes are not dN·lared im-alicl because in 
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their application factual difficulties may arise. 
(Emphasis added.) 
In holding that factual difficulties may not invalidate a 
statute, the California Supreme Court is not holding that 
factual impossibility or unreasonableness cannot be the 
basis of invalitlation of a statnte. In Broadbent v. Gib-
son, 140 P.2d 939 (Utah 1943), the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the Utah Sunday Closing law could not be 
applied uniformly throughout the state without being 
unreasonably diseriminatory. The holding of the court 
was based in part upon the difficulty of administration of 
Ruch a law and the discriminations arising from such ad-
ministration. In the instant case, the district court held 
that the requirement placed upon defendants to ascertain 
their costs prior to selling these particular items would 
be unreasonable. This was strictly in accordance with 
the cYidence in the case. 
In further support of its contention that "cost" as 
11s(•cl in the Utah statute should be construed to mean an 
m·eragP cost rather than an exacit standard, intervenor-
nppellmit cites the case of State v. Langly, 84 P.2cl 767 
(\\'yo. 1938). At page 14 of its brief, intervenor-appel-
1 aiit states that: 
The Langly opinion answered the contrary hold-
ing of the California lower court in Balzer v. 
Caler, supra, which was later disapproved also by 
the Supreme Court of California as noted above. 
No reasonable reading of the cases cited by inrter-
venor-appellant can be said to hold that the California 
Supreme Court disapproved the constitutional issue in 
Bal.zcr v. Caler. As stated above, that case did not reach 
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the constitutional question. The case was not even cited 
in People v. Payless Drug Stores, s11pra, nor lVliolc.sale 
Tobacco Dealers' Bureau "· NatioJ1al Candy & Tobac·r·u 
Co., supra., the cases upon which intervenor-appellant 
relies. 
Intervenor-appellant also relies on the -Wyoming 
case of State v. Lm1gly, .supra, as upholding their con-
tention that the term "cost" is not unconstitutionally 
Yague and ambiguous. They fail to mention the facts of 
the Longly case. In that case, the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty to a criminal charge under the -Wyoming 
statute, and thereafter filed a motion in arrest of judg-
ment claiming that the statute was unconstitutional. 
Therefore, there was no trial upon the merits of the 
case. The trial court had no evidence before it as to the 
actual facts. Hence, any determination with respect to 
the constitutionality of the statute involved could not 
have been based upon the reasonability of its applicatiou, 
since the application of the statute was not questioned hy 
the eYidence. In fact, the majority of the court felt that 
it ·was not even necessary to discuss the cost defiuition por-
tion of the s.tatute. State Y. Lmzgly, supra, at 781. Interve-
nor-appellant at pages 14 and 15 of its brief, cites a long 
quotation from the aboYe case. The quotation, in itself, 
dictum though it may be, proves the case for defenclaut-
respondent. In order to get the full meaning of this 
quote, the entire secition should be quoted, including the 
part omitted by intervenor-appellant. 
rrhese illustrations suffice to show the obstacles in 
the way of the legislature to do what the Calif or-
nia court abon-mention<:>cl intimates should be 
-±2 
done, and that these matters had better be left to 
general business methods. The legislature, doubt-
less, had such general business methods - rea-
sonable standards of cost-accounting for the var-
ious classes of business - in mind and believed 
them to exist. If they do not exist - if cost can-
not be ascertained - then the act in question 
should be held to be unconstitutional. If, on the 
other hand, cost is ascertainable, under reason-
able methods, then such cost is purely a question 
nf fact, definite and certain, and the standard of 
conduct set by the legislature, too, is definite and 
certain. The non-e.ristence of such reasonable 
methods ca1111ot be presumed by the court, and if 
tl1at is so, then the burden of showing it, in order 
tl1at we might act up611 it, 'Was on the defendant, 
for upon him lies the duty to show the statute to 
be 11nconstit11tional [citation omitted], but no evi-
dence 1cas introduced in this case .... Hence, we 
should hardly be justified, in the absence of evi-
dence to the contrary, in holding that it did not 
hm-e in mi11d [the Legislature] such reasonable 
accounting methods in the belief that they in fact 
c•xist .... In that ....-iew of the case, the standard 
s0t by the legislature is virtually reduced to one 
of "reasonableness." And it is held that "rea-
sonableness" as "the standard of an aet which 
can he determined objectively from circumstances, 
i o; a common, widely-used, and constitutionally 
,·alid standard in law." State v. Langley, supra, 
at 770, 780. (Emphasis added.) 
Th<• ':ery cases cited and relied upon by intervenor-
;1p1w llm1t pro....-e the case for defendant. The Langly 
('()11rt, i11 dictum stated that if cost could not be ascer-
tai1wd, then the Act in question should be held unconsti-
tutio1rn l. The lower court in the instant case found ( 1) 
that defendants were using reasonable, cost-accounting 
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methods, and (2) that it 1rnuld be unreasonable to re-
quire defendants to refine their costs as required by the 
Act since cost in many cases cannot be so refined. Tlw8e 
findings of the court are supported Ly the evidence. It 
should further be noted that in this case cited by inter-
venor-appellant, the court did not have before it eYi-
dence upon which it could rightly decide whether or not 
the statute was unconstitutional in its use of the term 
"cost." Therefore, it was only proper that the statute 
be upheld. In the absence of any evidence to the con-
trary, the court stated: 
[W] e must presume that the legislature did not 
intend to prescribe that the cost must be abso-
lutely exact, that it must be based upon the pre-
cise method of accounting which any one mer-
chant might adopt, but meant, by "cost," what 
business men genera1ly mean, namely, the approx-
imate cost arrived at by a reasonable rule. State 
v. Langly, supra, at 779. (Emphasis added.) 
This language of the court is pure dictum. See State Y. 
Larngly, supra, at 781. The cases cited by interveuor-
appellant as being in accord with this Yiew, without ex-
ception, are also cases which arose without a trial 011 
the merits. Wholesale Tobacco Dealers' Bureau v. Na-
tional Candy & Tobacco Co., 82 P.2cl 3 (Calif. 1938), was 
a case which came up upon an admitted violation of the 
Act. There was no trial. The sole question presented 
on appeal had to do with the constitutionality of ccrtai11 
sections of the Act. From the agreed state of facts which 
the court sets forth, it would appear that the "cost'' 
question was moot in this case, since cost of doing busi-
ness was a well-established fact in the industry involved. 
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1J'li0lesalc Tobaceo Dealers' Bureau Y. National Candy & 
Tobacco Co., supra at 7. Hence, it will be s0en that this 
l'HRC is e11tirely iuapposite and nonsupport for the propo-
sition cited. The question of cost was not a factor in the 
case, and no eYidence was taken as to the reasonableness 
of a eost determination. Further quoting from the same 
statement of the court: 
TVe h ave no way of ascertaining in this case 
whether the proi·isions relating to the cost of 
doing business contained in the act are too uncer-
tain and indefinite to reasonably be applied by 
any merchant. Appellant and its supporting amici 
curiae urge with great \'ehemence that it is prac-
tically impossible for any merchant to have avail-
able the necessary facts for calculation of cost of 
<1oing business as applied to each article during 
the course of any current year. Respondent and 
its supporters urge that simple and proper ac-
counti11g practices will disclose the necessary in-
formation. Under such circumstances the issue 
C'a11not and should not be determined in this pro-
ceeding. TYhen and if the issue is properly pre-
sented against a pro per factual backgroimd with 
the appropriate euidentiary material, this court 
can then and only then determine the reasonable-
ness of this provision. Wholesale Tobacco Deal-
ers' B11rea11 v. National Candy and Tobacco Co., 
supra. (Emphasis added.) 
Associated 111 ercha.nts v. Ormes her, 86 P.2d. 1031 
(:l\1011t. 1939) is also cited as being in accord with the 
La11gly case in upholding the proposition that cost need 
not be specifically determined. The eYidence in this 
ease, on appeal, consisted only of the judgmenrt roll with-
ont the CYidenee adduced at trial. The court stated at 
page 1032: 
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[HJ ence the oHly question for us to detf>rmi1w is 
whether Chapter 80 is Yalid. Tltis we must deter-
mine from the Act itself lt'itl/011t the aid of factual 
background sa1·e as appears from the findings of 
fact. (Emphasis added.) 
There was no fi11cli11g of fact as to the reasonableness or 
nnreasona blcness of the cost cletermiua ti on prm-ision. 
At page 1036 the court qnotcs exknsiwly from Staff! \'. 
Langly and comes to the conclusion that the Legislature 
has, by the Unfair Practicrs Act, virtnally enacted a rnlr 
of reasonableness. If the test is rcasona blencss, the lo\\·-
er con rt in the instant case found as a matter of fact and 
as a conclusion of law the 1·equirements of the Utah 
statute were unreasonable as applic•d to these dcfenclanls. 
State Y. Sea rs, 103 P.2cl 331 CW ash. Hl40) is also 
cited in support of the proposition that cost need not he 
specifically determi11cd. That casP arose upon the owr-
ruli11g of a demurrer and clefomlant ha,·ing elcetecl to 
stand on his demurrer apprale(l. There "·as no cYi-
clence taken as to the application of the statute to spe-
cific facts. The case was deeided wholl;- upon the plead-
ings and the law invoked. At page :344 thr court statPs: 
If ·we had before U8 a proper far·tual uad·-
ground, we might more easily d0termi11e whether 
(\r not the terms "cost" a ncl "cost of doi11g lrnsi-
ness," as rlefiued 11;- cha pt er [sic] 221, a re not too 
uncertain and indefinite to reasonably he applied 
Jn- any merchant, lnrt we ha re in this case mily the 
l~11g11~ge of the statute, and we arc: not prepared 
to say at this time, judged by the language of the 
statute a101u', that simple and prnper accounting 
practices ''"ill not disc lose tho 11ecessa ry informa-
tion. ( J;~mphasis ad<led.) 
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It can he seen from the facts of this case and the lan-
g·uage of tlie court itself that the court did not consider 
that the prnper factual hackgrouud had been presented 
for the determination of the reasonableness question as 
to cost determination. The court had no other choice 
but to uphold the statute. 
Intenenor-appellant further cites the case of Dikeou 
Y. Food Distributors Ass'n, 108 P.2d 529 (Colo. 1940), as 
support for the proposition that cost need not be spe-
cifically determined. Cited as upholding the constitu-
tionality of the averaged cost determination, this case 
is inapposite. At page 531, the court states: 
The co11stit11tio11ality of the Act is not chal-
lrnged either in the briefs or assignments of er-
ror. (Empasis added.) 
Flouk Oil Co. Y. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 
::l4D P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1960) is another case cited by in-
ll•rnnor-appellant iu support of this same general 
prnpositi011. The posture of the case is adequately set 
fol'th in the following quofo from page 1009: 
In seeking reversal, the plaintiff raises the fol-
lowing points: (1) that it was improper to deter-
mi1w the constitutionality of the Act on motion to 
clismiss; that the lack of valid standard is not ap-
parent 011 the face of the statute and consequently 
the quc>stion of adequacy of the standard is ascer-
tainable only in light of the evidence 011 the trial. 
The appellate comt clid uphold the statute but it had 
uo alteruati,-e. It had no evidencP as to reasonableness 
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of the standard of cost and henre could not hold the 
standard unconstitutional. At page 1013 the court makes 
an extensive quotation from TVlw!esalc Tobacco Dealers 
Bureau of Southern California, Inc., v. National Candy & 
Tobacco Co., supra, in which the California court com-
ments upon its inability to pass upon the constitutional 
question because the issue is not properly presented in 
an adeqnafo factual background. The Flank case, in ap-
proving and restating this position taken in the Califor-
nia case, is in fact saying that it has not had the proper 
f'videntiary background presented. Hence, the court in 
the Flank case was not considering the reasonableness of 
the "cost" cletermination stall(larcl since it did not han' 
before it the proper evidence to do so. 
Internnor-appellant further cites the case of People 
v. Kahn, 60 P.2d 596 (Calif. 1936) as upholding the 
California statut0 against the '' ,·oid for \'agneness'' dr-
f ense. Defendant in that case was argning that the term 
"cost" in the statute involved was so vague and. ambig-
uous as to make it impossible to comply ·with the statute. 
It should be noted that this was a criminal case which 
arose upon defendant's pka of gni1t)·. Therefore, as in the 
other cases cited by intervenor-appellants, there \YHS no 
competent e\·idence 1Jefore the court as to reasonableness 
or to show impossihility or possibilit)· of proving cost. 
In upholding the statut0, the court in the Kahu cmw 
also made much of the fact that the statute required all 
intent to injure rompetitors and. destroy competition. 
Hence, the uncertainty of the cost determination was 
aided b)· the requirement that actual i11te11t to injure com-
+8 
pditors and destrny competition be shown. The Utah 
.td here questioned does not require a showing of acitual 
intent to injure competitors and destroy competition. All 
that is required is "an intent and purpose of inducing 
the purchase of other merchandise." The Utah Act pre-
sumes that such an intent is bad and should be punished. 
Lt is tlonbtful, had such a presumption been available 
m1der the California statute, whe1her the California 
eonrt would ha\'e upheld the Act. 
In contrast to the factual bases upon which the cases 
eitNl h~· inte1Tenor-appellant arose, the case of State ex 
rel. Ai/(lerson v. Fleming Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1969), 
arosL· after a trial on the merits in an action for an in-
jnnetion. The statute there involved (an unfair prac-
til'es art applying only to milk) was held unconstitu-
lio11al heea use it had no definition of cosrt. The court 
n•;jec!ecl the "good faith" argument based upon the dif-
ficulty in accounting and bookkeeping systems. Under 
different systems, cliffprent costs would be determined. 
For the proposition that the Unfair Practices Act 
·with its presumption as to cost to the retailer is not a 
Jiriee-fixing measure, intervenor-appellant also cites Rust 
1·. Uriggs, 113 S.\,V. 2cl 733 (Tenn. 1938). The appeal in 
that case arose on the overruling of a demurrer filed by 
the dC'f endant "·hich challenged the construction put 
npon the Act hy complainant and which also challenged 
the rnlidity of the whole Act. A chancellor overruled the 
demurrer and grantetl the injunction as prayed. The de-
f rndant elected to stand upon his demurrer, sought a 
special appeal and was granted a special appeal to the 
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Supreme Court of Te11nesser. Thr cm;e did no·t arise 
from an exploration of the faets at trial. The merits of 
this case were never tried. It should be 11oteu that as to 
the price-fixing issue, the court summarilv dismissed the 
issue without even considering it. 
In consideration of this statute \Ye may first ob-
seri·e that it is not a price-fixing law. · It is not 
therefore necessary to co11sider decisions of this 
court and the Supreme Court of the United States 
respecting statutes of that sort. Rust Y. Griggs, 
supra, at 735. (Emphasis added.) 
As can be seen from this language (which is all of the 
language rel a ting to price fixing in the case) the court 
did not eyen seriously consider the matter for which 
intervenor-appellant cites the case. 
InterYenor-appellants further cite this case in sup-
port of their proposition that 6% presumptions as to cost 
have generally been upheld. Again, the factual back-
ground of the case should be noted and it should be ob-
served that there was no e\·idence before the court as 
to the effect of this presumption, as there is in the i11-
stant case. Rust v. Griggs, supra at 736. It is also in-
teresting to note the difference in the statute inyolved iu 
the Rust case which allowed the price or cost to be srt 
at "cost to the most efficient retailers." In the case at 
bar, cost must be set at a "proportionate part" of one's 
own cost. As to the quote on the bottom of page 33 of 
intervenor-appellant's brief, it should he 11oted that the 
facts of the Rust case seYerely water its efficacy. Dr-
fenclant-Respondents' case is made hy the last sentcJtcr 
of the last sentence of the quote. Intcrn~uor-appellallt 
quotes "the presumption t hns ncated of course may l1r 
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rcludted." (Emphasis added.) The presumption as to 
coHt of doing business in the Utah statute now before the 
comt lias been shO"wn by the facts of this case to be a 
eonclnsi\'C presumption and not rebuttable. 
At page 38 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites 
Jfrlntire \'. Bora/sky, 39 A. 2d 471 (N.H. 1948) in sup-
purt of the proposition that the prima facie evidence 
of a ,-iola tion pro\'ided in the statute was constitutional. 
rrltis case \\'as an aotion for an injunction. At page 472 
the court quotes the Ne\\' Hampshire statute which states 
that : 
'l'he ach·ertisement or sale at less than such cost 
"Hhall he prim a facie evidence of a violation of 
thi8 chapter." 
The statntc also provic1es for a 6% markup to cover the 
cost of doing husiuess in the absence of proof of a lesser 
C'ost. 
111 commenting npon the prima facie evidence pro-
1·i8iou of the statute, which, it should be noted, is not con-
tained in the Utah statute, the court stated: 
TJia,t part of Section 2 pro,:iding that adver-
tisements or sale below cost are prirna facie evi-
dence of a violatiou of the Act is also attacked. 
8 i1u·c 1w coucl usirc presumption of guilt is creat-
ed, \Vig-more see8 no constitutional problem. 4 
\Vig. E''· 2d Ed. §1356. So long as there is a ra-
tio 11al co1111ection bPiiccen the fact to be proved 
a11d the fact presumed, the statute is valid. Mcin-
tire v. Borofsky, supra, at 473. 
'I1hc prinw facic evidence statutes which intervenor-
ap1w1lant continues to cite as supporting cases are not 
51 
the same as the 6% presumptiou as to cost of doing busi-
ness provided in the Utah staitnte. '11 h(~ Utah statute con-
tains no prima facie evideuce provision. Defendant is 
arguing against the conclusiveness of the 6% presump-
tion. Therefore, the cases relaiting to pri1na f acie evi-
dence provisions of statutes are inapposite. It should be 
noted that in all of these cases 6ted by appellants on 
prima facie question, the statute also contains a presump-
tion such as contained in the Utah staitute. With respect 
to the prim a f acie provision of the New Hampshire stat-
ute, the Mcintire court goes on to state that in New 
Hampshire prima facie evidence as used means only evi-
dence to be considered by the jury. An absence of 
other evidence does not compel a verdict of guilty. The 
court states, "In view of the limited effect give11 to prima 
f acie evidence in this jurisdiction, we cannot say that 
its application to unfair competition is unreasonable.'' 
Since the New Hampshire courts have construed prim a 
f acie evidence provisions very narrowly and since under 
New Hampshire law failure to rebut a prima fa.cie case 
does not mean guilt and also si11ce Utah statute contains 
no prima facie provision but only a 6% presumption as 
to cost of doing business also contained in the other 
statutes, it would appear that these cases involving 
prima facie provisions are not applicable at all to the 
instant ca~e. 
Based upon the construction of the above cases as 
set forth and the distinguishing factors evident in eacli 
of these cases, intervenor-appellant's arguments as to 
cost seem to be straw men. I11 the firs.t place, the Utah 
statute requires an exact computation of cost. No other 
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n•a<li11g can rem;onahly be given the 1rnrds "a markup 
to <·m·er a prnportionate part of the cost of <loing busi-
ness, w Ji ich markup, i11 the absence of proof of a lesser 
<·ost, shall be six percent .... " But, even if plaintiff's 
arg-ument as to a reasonableness standard were adopted, 
the lower rourt found that requiriug defendants to com-
pute the cost in order to comply with the statute was 
1111 rl:'asom1blc aml arhitrary, and constituted unconstitu-
1 io11al price fixi11g. rrhis is truly within the weight of the 
eYi<lence presented at the trial. It is significant that none 
of the cases cited by intenenor-appellant invoke a sit-
na tio11 where a trial 1vas had on the merits with evidence 
presented as to reasonableness of the standard. All of 
these determinations were made at the appellate lenl 
and many of the courts, as has been pointed out, indi-
cated their inability to make a determination because 
of the lack of facitua1 background. It is also significant 
that 110110 of the cases cited by appellants are base<l upon 
.~tatutes containing the language "prowwtionatc part" 
eoutained in the Utah Act. 
1'he argument of defendants in this regard is that 
un<kr their merchandising conditions and their book-
heping and accounting methods, proportionate costs for 
itt>ms sold cannot be determined in many cases prior to 
their sale. Here the statute requires a determina,tion of 
c•xact cost - pro po rtiouate part of the cost of doing 
hnsiuess. The court found that such a requirement is un-
reasonable and many times impossible. Intervenor-ap-
pellan t argues for a reasonable allocation of costs to each 
ih•m and states: 
53 
Thus, ascertainment of the cost of any item is no1 
only possible, but at the present time is actually 
done by Skaggs before the item is priced. Bric:f 
of Intervenor-appellant at 19. 
It is submitted that interyenor-appe11ants are miscon-
struing the statute and taking out of context the state-
ments made at the trial and cited on pages 19 and 20 of 
its brief. It ·will be seen from the citations to the rec-
ord made on pages 19 and 20 of intern•nor-appellant 'R 
brief that the allocations of cost practiced by Skaggs 
and Grand Central are decidedly different. Therefore, on 
the ,-ery same item with the very same invoice pricl', 
Skaggs and Grand Central can come up with a different 
"cost" under the Act. Both defcnda11ts testified that 
this was only an average or estimated cost and not a pro-
portionate cost as required b~- the statute. After its 
statements as to the a1loration of different items by 
Skaggs and Grand Central, intervenor-appellant makes 
the follo'.ving statement: 
There is 110 allocrntion of office expense or utili-
ties, but it is submitted that such an allocatiou 
could he made on some reasonable basis without 
undue difficulty or expense. 
There is no foundation in tl1e reconl for such a state-
ment, there "-as no evidence introduced at the trial that 
such was the case. Intervenor-appellant has fabricated 
this suppo(>ed evidence from whole cloth. In fact, the 
opposite was found. The trial court found that such allo-
cations could not be reasonably made by the defendants. 
It will be seen from the transcript and the record in thi~ 
case that such a finding was amply supported hy the eri-
dence and cannot he overturne<l by this court. 
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'l'he quotations from :\Ir. Hayward of defendant, 
Grand Central, a11d :\Ir. Sinclair of defendant, Skaggs, 
as to their accounting procedure set forth on pages 20 
and 21 of intervenor-appellant's brief, do nothing but 
support defendants' case. Both 1\fr. Hayward and Mr. Sin-
clair give as one reaRon for their failure to allocate many 
of the costs to the merchandise the fact that such allo-
catio11 would he impractical and unreasonable. Both ad-
mitted that such allocation might not be impossible. It 
is submitted that there is very little in this world ·which 
is impossible. The Utah Act, howeyer, requires an ex-
act or proportionate allocation of the costs of doing busi-
neRs and the standard, as set forth by the cases cited in 
internnor-appel1ant 's brief, is not one of "possibility." 
'rlie standard contendecl by intervenor-appellant is of 
reasonability and the court, in the instant case, found 
that the Utah statute requiring, as it does, the alloca-
tion of proportionate cost to particular items was unrea-
s01rnblc. On page 21 of its brief, intervenor-appellant 
states: 
'l'here is absolutely no basis in the evidence for 
the apparent conclusion that further refinement 
of accounting procedures used by either of the de-
f ernlants would he or is an impossible or even an 
impractical alternative. 
lt is submitted that the following references to the 
transcript do, in fact, provide ample evidence for the 
finding that this refinement would be unreasonable, that 
heing the standard rather than impossibility or imprac-
ticalitv. (R. 106, 111, 115, 116, 118-19.) Since the allo-
r·ation of costs as requirecl by the statute is unreasonable, 
and crea.tes in fact an irrehuttablc presumption that the 
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"proportionate part'' of a retailer's cost of doing bnsi-
ness is 6%, the statute in fact fixes prices at invoice 
price plus 6%, and c011travene 's Article XII, Section 
20 of the Utah Constitution. 
A comparison of the 6% presumption to the 10% 
standard deduction of the federal and state income tax 
laws is completely inappropriate. See discussion at 
pages 46-47, supra. The altemative to the 10% standard 
deduction under the income tax laws is computable by 
after-the-fact accounting methods. No taxpayer is re-
quired to predict in advance what his deductions will be 
and allocate them to specific items of merchandise. How-
ever, the 6% presumption creatrcl by the Utah Unfair 
Practices Ac1t requires cost accounting in advance of 
sales. It requires the merchant to predict in advance 
what his "cost of doing business" is and then allocates 
this cost to the various items of merchandise which he 
sells. It is submitted that after such merchandise is 
sold, for instance at year's end, a merchant could, by 
after-the-fact accounting methods, allocate a fairly accu-
rate cost to the items of merchandise which he has sold. 
It is therefore submittell that the legislature did not aid 
the merchant by the use of the 6% presumption and even 
if it were intended to aid the merchant, it does not in 
fact aid the merchant. The court is correct in its find-
ing th~t the 6j1c) presumption leaves no alternative and 
m fact becomes a conclusive presumption of the cost 
of doing business, and m1coustitutiona1ly fixes pricet:. 
Respondents are uot, as alleged hy intervenor-ap-
pellants, seeking to have their cost accounting done for 
them by someone else. Respomlents assert, and the court 
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so held, that the 81atute is unworkable. They cannot allo-
cate their costs to the items sold and hence cannot comply 
\\'ith the statute. 
POIN'r 4 
THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT THAT 
"COST TO THE RETAILER" BE THE 
"COS'l' ... TO THE RETAILER WITHIN 
THIRTY DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF 
THE SALE, OR DATE OF OFFERING FOR 
RA LE" AND THAT "REPLACEMENT 
COST" BE THE PRICE AT WHICH MER-
CHANDISE SOLD OR OFFERED FOR SALE 
COULD BE BOUGHT "AT ANY TIME WITH-
IN THIRrry DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF 
'l'HE SALE, OR DATE UPON WHICH IT IS 
OFFERED FOR SALE" DISCRIMINATES 
AGAINsrr A LARGE VOLUME RETAILER 
SUCH AS DEFENDANT AND DEPRIVES 
rr OF ITS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW AND DENIES IT EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LA "\V. FURTHER, 
SAID PROVISIONS ARE VAGUE, AMBIG-
UOUS AND UNREASONABLE AND PLACE 
UNREA80NABLE BURDENS UPON DE-
FENDANTS. 
Large volnme retailing operations such as defend-
auts are able to exist in today's competitive world be-
eause of their efficiency. One area in which they are able 
to t•eonomize is in their purchasing departments. As 
siatecl in the tesrf:imony of l\fr. Keith Warshaw, the per-
l'Oll in charge of purchasing for defendant, Grand Cen-
tral has seYeral different methods of buying, depending 
npon the particular merchandise. 
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\Vith respect to much of the merchandise purchased 
by Grauel Central, the testimony is tliat it is purchased 
far in advance of the sale date. An example is given of 
Christmas merchandise. ::\Ir. vVarshaw testified that 
Christmas merchandise may be bought as far as six 
months in advance. As a result of this early buying, de-
fendant receives substantial discounts. The testimony 
explains that one of the reasons for these discounts is 
that early buys such as this enable manufacturers to keep 
their plants in opera,tion the year around. Mr. Warshaw 
also testified that if he were to run out of some of this 
merchandise purchased at an early date and have to re-
stock it near Christmastime, the price would be substan-
tially higher due to the loss of the early buying discount, 
possibly a volume discount, and freight factor. On these 
early buys where large quantity is bought, the freight 
would be substantially reduced on a p€r-item hasis. 
Therefore, the testimony is that whenever possible, de-
fendant Grand Central buys early and buys in volume. 
The statute, by requiring that cost be determined 
\Yithin thirty days prior to the datP of sale or the date 
of offering for sale, scnrely tliscriminatcs against de-
fendants in that it neutralizes this ability they lrnn~ to 
buy early and to buy in volume. If Grauel Central were 
to purchase Christmas wrapping paper six months before 
Christmas on an early-buy program, under the statute 
m1y of this wrapping paper sold on Chris,tmas En would 
have to be sold based upon a theoretical replacement cost 
on November 24. The testimony in the record irn1icates 
that the cost on N ovemher 24 would be substantially 
greater than the cos't actually paid for the merchandise. 
i .. 
H(•J1Cl', the statutt" is reqmnng Grand Central to pur-
chase 011 the same basis that the small corner grocery 
store woul<l pnrchase, where this grocer cannot, due to 
liis \·olume, take adnrntage of early buying or volume 
buying. "BJarly buying and volume buying are legitimate 
lrnsi]l(•ss practices. By denying defendant the benefit 
uf these legitimate husiHess practices and forcing it to 
set its prices at the prices of its less efficient competitors, 
tl1e .A C't in fact discriminates against defendants and de-
nies them equal protection of the law. See Cohen v. Frey 
& 8011, Inc., 80 A.2d 267 (l\Icl. 1951). In taking from de-
frn(lm1ts this advantage which they are able to gain 
tlirough their efficiency and size, the statute is taking 
from the defendants their property without due process 
of law, aml violates equal protection of the law. Cohen v. 
Frey, s111Jra; Serrer v. Cigarrttr Sen-ice Co., 76 N.E. 
2d 91 (Ohio 1947). See State v. Wender, 141 S.E. 2d 
:riD CW. Va. 1965). 
The tl•stimou)· also indicates that on certain occa-
siom; def endnnt Grand Central has advertised specials. 
As RPt forth in the stipulation, Grand Central purchased 
tmke:n:; 011 NowmlJcr 8, 1065, at $.33V~ per pound. There-
aftc•r, on Decemlwr 17, 1965, mor ethall thirty days after 
Uw original pure base, clef endant purchased additional 
t mke)·s at an invoice cost of $.37% per pound. On De-
CC'mhc•r ] 7, 1965, and thereafter, defendant had in stock 
('Ommiuglecl frozen tom turkeys purchased on Novem-
liPr 8, 1965, at $.33V~ per pound and on December 17, 
1963, at $.37V~ per pound. These commingled turkeys were 
~nli;,;0qneJ1tly sold b;· defendant on and after December 
17, 1%3, for $.37 per pound. Under the Act, this was a 
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violation because the turkeys purchased on November 
8, were sold more than thirty days after purchase. 'l1here-
fore, the ''cost to the retailer'' Rhonld ha;-e been deter-
mined upon the basis of replacement cost or a theoretical 
replacement cost. If Grand Central had advertised a 
special beginning December 7, and running through 
ChriS'tmas, on turkeys based upon the lower original 
cost, under the statute, after December 8 it would haYc 
to raise the price even though it was still selling the ini-
tially-purchased turkeys. Such a requirement places an 
unreasonable burden upon defendant to keep its mn-
chandise segregated so that it knows when it purchased 
each item. U also penalizes defendant in that it does not 
allow it to take advantage of its earlier price and sell 
for a correspondingly lower price. In attempting through 
this method to stabilize prices, the Act in fact discrimi-
nates against the more efficient refailer and promotes the 
inefficient retailer. 
This thirty-day pricing requirement is arbitrary, 
unreasonably discriminatory and has no rele\-ance to 
the purpose of this statute. See State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 
920 (Utah 1938). Statutory discriminations such as this 
resulting in limitations upon the defendant's property 
rights, are valid only if they have a reasonable relation-
Ehip to the purpose of the Act. See State v. Mason, 
supra. The legislative policy of the Act and its purpose 
as stated in Section 13-5-17, Utah Code Annotated (Repl. 
vol. 1962), is "to safeguard the public against the crea-
tion or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster and en-
courage competition, by prohibiting unfair and dis-
criminatory practices by which fair and honest compc-
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tion is destroyed or prevented.'' The thirty-day require-
ment does not in any ~way foster and encourage compe-
tition, nor docs it 11rohibit unfair and discriminatory 
practices. In fact, what it does is prohibit fair and effi-
cieut retailing. It cannot be argued that the prevention 
of efficient retailing helps to preserve honest compe-
tition. As stated before, all this does is promote inef-
ficiency and tend to stabilize the retailing market on the 
level of the more inefficient retailer. This cannot be said 
to "safeguard the public." Utah Code Ann. §13-5-17 
( Hepl. YOl. 1962). 
Further, it should be noted that by placing the thir-
ty-day restriction in the definition of replacement cost 
&ml inYoice cost, the sfatute creates a vague, ambiguous 
and unenforceable standard placing an unreasonable 
lmrden on the retail merchant. See discussio~ page 77, 
infra. In a large \'Olume retailing operation such as that 
of defendant, it is virtually impossible for defendant to 
keep track of his stock so as to know whe.ther or not he 
is selliug it within the thirty-day period. The Act would 
se<'m to require that defendant check his shelves every 
day to make sure that not one bottle of aspirin or one can 
of hair spray is being sold (or offered for sale) more 
than thirty days after its purchase based upon the pur-
ehase price. Then, after having found his bottle of as-
pirin or can of hair spray on the shelf which was pur-
ehase<l more than thirty days before its sale date (or 
offer for sale) he would have to adjust the price. There 
arises then the possibility that he could have thirty dif-
ferent prices on the same item of merchandise. That is 
to say if purchases of aspirin or hair spray were made 
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each da)· of the mouth, then tl1en•nfh'r th<' 011es 110t sold 
prior to the expiratiou of the thirty-day period would 
haYe to he re-mark0<1. l-fr11ee, e\·01·y day certain of tlw 
items \rnuld be re-marked, hasecl upon the flucrt:uati11g 
price of the commoditY. As was stated ill the testimom . . 
of ::\Ir. Keith vVarshaw, items such as hair spray fluc-
tuate in price greatly. (R. G3) To keep track of thes(' 
prices in order to comply with the Act would he impos-
sible. The Act also becomes Yague and ambiguous in its 
determirn1tion and use of the thirty-day period in that it 
clocs not say \\'hose price the replacement price shall he 
As stated in the testimony of ::\fr. Keith ·w arshaw, there 
are numerous places where one can obtain hair spray. 
(R. 63-64) Renee•, it cannot lle dt>termined whether the 
theoretical replacement price is to he based upon the 
price at which the rntailer eol1lcl haYc l10ught this saml' 
commodity from the same supplil•r, from a (lifferent sup-
plier, from a wl1olesaler, from a johlwr or eYen as a 
job her. 
In its application, this sedion of the statute becomes 
so ,-ague and amliigucms and pl aces such a lmrd0n upmt 
the merchant tlrnt it cnnllot he 11ph0lcl as eonstitutio11al. 
See State PX rel. English Y. R11back, 281 N.·w. 607 (Neb. 
1038); Henrie \T. Rocky Jltn. Parkiug Corp., 202 P.2d 727 
(Utah 1949). The trial court in the case at bar con-
cluded that: 
The dcfi11iti011 of th0 term ''replacement eos·t" 
in the Ad is yagne, nmhignons and unenforceable 
and places au um·eas011al)le bnnl0n on the retail 
mcrclia11t ill dl'krminiug whether or not his price 
for a particular item of merchandise is or is 110! 
i11 Yiolation of the Aet. '' (R. 44) 
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For the proposition that the term" replacement cost" 
may lw easily asC'ertainecl hy merely keeping abreast of 
the current market aml is not violative of standards of 
,·ag·ueness, intervenor-appellant cites Hill v. Kusy, 35 
~.~W. 2d 394 (Neh. 1949). This case arose when plain-
tiff filed for a declaratory judgment and an injunction 
against defendant for violating the Sale-Below-Cost Act. 
Plaintiffs also asked for damages and for equitable re-
!irf. Defe11dant demurred on the ground that the peti-
tion did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause 
of action against him. Tlw trial court oYerruled the de-
llllllTer and gave the defendant time to further plead. De-
fell<lant refused to further uplead and the trial court 
(lcer0e<l the Act was not m1constitutiona1. The case cit0d 
h>· ddernlant did not arise upon a trial on the merits. It 
earn(' up on a demurrer. The trial court did not have 
hefor0 it the f;:wts or circumstances which the lower court 
in the irn;fant case had. The following quote appears on 
!>ag(' ,)9( of the Hill case, and should be noted with re-
se1wet to the proposition for which intenenor-appellant 
l'ites the case: 
It fur1ther is urged that there is a lack of clarity, 
\\·liich renclers the act void, in the meaning of the 
terms ust'd in the act, such as ''replacement cost,'' 
"proportionate part of the cost of doing busi-
11ess'' and ''unfairlv diverting trade from a com-
petitor.'' The ten~s may present difficulties in 
npplication 1rhe11 the s11fficiency of evidence in 
fact questions is presented. Mere difficuilty of ap-
pliea ti on in the process of li tiga ti on is .not enoug? 
to l'llable a court to say that a statute is u11consh-
tutio11al. (Emphasis added.) 
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In the insitant case, the trial court had ample evi-
dence before it to sustain its findings and conclusions 
that the "cost" provisions of the Utah Act were uncou-
stitutional. These findings should be upheld 011 thi~ 
appeal. 
POINT 5 
THE STATUTORY DEFINITION OF CORT, 
BY PERMITTING THE DEDUCTION OF 
TRADE DISCOUNTS AND EXCLUDING THJi; 
DEDUCTION OF CASH DISCOUNTS, IS UN-
CONSTITUTIONALLY YAGUE AND AMBIG-
lTOUS AND DISCR11\1INATES -WITHOUT 
REASON B E rr-w E E N TYPES OF DIS-
COUN'l18. 
Classifications, in order to be valid, must he reaso11-
a ble. :J\fr. Justice -Wolfe, in the case of State v. 1Vlaso11, 
78 P.2d 920 (Utah 1938), very ahl~v sets out the test: 
Of course, every legislative act is in one 
sense discriminaton'. The Legislature cannot leg-
islate as to all persons or all subject matters. It 
is inclusive as to some class or group and as to 
some human relatonships, transactions, or func-
tions and exclusive as to the remainder. For that 
reason, to he unconstitutional the discrimination 
must he unreasonable or arbitrary. A classifica-
tion is- never unreasonable or arbitrary in its in-
clusion or exclusion features so long as there is 
some basis for the differention between the class-
es for subject matters included as compared to 
those excluded from its operation, provided the 
differention l1Pars a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be acconiz)lished by tlze art. State'· 
Mason, s1111ra at 923. (Emphasis added.) 
64 
It is also clear that statutes proscribing otherwise le-
g;itirnnte co11dnet must he snfficienfly clear so as to inform 
the possihle \'iolator of a violation. In State v. Packard, 
2:>0 P.2d 361 (Utah 1952), ~Ir. Justice Crockett se1t forth 
the test nry clearly: 
Concerni11g the ques,tion of uncertainty or 
vagueness of statutes, the authorities seem to be 
in accord that the test a statute must meet to be 
valid is: It must he sufficiently definite (a) to 
iuform persons of ordinary intelligence, who 
would he law abiding, what their conduct must be 
to conform to its requirements; (b) to advise 
a def end ant accused of violating it just wha,t con-
stitutes the offense with which he is charged, and 
( c) to he susceptible of uniform interpretation 
and application by those charged with responsi-
bility of applying and enforcing it. State v. Pack-
ard, s111Jra, at 564. (Emphasis added.) 
rrhe sfatnte involved in the instant case violates 
both of these above-mentioned rules in thart it unreason-
n hi>' aml arbitrarily excludes "discounts for cash" from 
11H' fa vorahle treatment given "all trade discounts" in 
the definition of cost to the retailer. The Act is also un-
c 011stitio11ally vague and ambiguous in that it fails to 
nrlc'qua tely define the terms "trade discounts" and "cash 
cfo;rouuts.'' 
The reconl in this case is replete with references to 
tl1c> different types of discounts obtained by defendants, 
1'.,rJ. R. 68-69, 72-73, 84, 90-91. Some of these discounts 
were described by Keith Warshaw as early booking, 
warehouse, anticipation, advertising, free goods, and 
l'O]ume discounts. (R. 68-69) In many cases, defendants 
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also receive a discount for early payment. Iu order to be' 
able to de<luet a discount from the selling price of an 
item, defendants must first dPtcrminc whether this dis-
count is a trade discount or cash discount. \Vith no defii-
11i1tio11al standards placed in the Act, this places upon 
defendant a heavy burden. \Vhether defendants can le-
gally deduct from its "cost" the early booking cliscount, 
the warehouse discount, the anticipation discount, the 
advertising discount, the free goods discount or the vol-
ume discount mus{ in the final analysis be determined by 
a court. In taking any of these discounts as a deduc-
tion on its "cost," a retailer is acting at its peril for at a 
later date any one of these discounts could be cla,ssed as 
a ''cash discount'' and hence disallowed. Disallowance 
of the discount could then subject the retailer to liabili-
ties and prosecution under the Act for a sale below cost. 
This latent ambiguity containecl in the terms "trade dis-
count'' and ''discounts for cash'' places an unreason-
able burden upon defendant. Under the standards set 
forth in State v. Packard, supra, this statute must he dr-
dared unconstitution. It is not sufficiently definite so as 
to inform a person of ordinary intelligence, who would 
be law abiding, what his conduct should be in order to 
conform to its requirements. It would take a person with 
a divine intelligence in order to determine what the Leg-
islature intended by the terms used in the statute. Nor 
is the statute sufficiently definite so as to advise a de-
fendant accused of violating it with what he is charged. 
If defendants were to take, for instance, their anticipa-
tion discount as a trade discount and hence deduct it 
from their ''cost,'' they could he prosecuted under the 
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;\ct for a criminal violatio11 and for ci\'il penalties if it 
\\'ere later determined that this anticipation discount is 
really a cash discount. The same would he true with any 
of the other discounts mentioned. Further, the statute 
is not susceptible of a uniform interpretation and appli-
catio11 by those charged with the responsibility of en-
forcing and applying it. Each retailer, by his type and 
1'olume of business, receives many different types of dis-
connh;. These discounts are variously enumera:ted. 
::vr any of the discounts, though called by a different name, 
are essentially the same. Uniform applicaition and in-
terpretation of this section would require regulations 
clearly setting forth each of the allowable discounts and 
each of the non-allowable discounts. Due to the very na-
tme of the retailing business, this would be practically 
impossible. The types and kinds of discounts vary with 
the t,\'pe of business involved. The vagueness of the 
standard creates practical impossibility with respect to 
t•nforcement. 
Under present retail marketing methods, where 
many types and kinds of discounrts are received and 
1rl1cr0 such discounts vary greatly between different 
d11 sses of businesses and different sizes of businesses, 
there iR a hsol utelv no basis for differentiation between 
"trade discounts" and "discounts for cash." Neither 
does this cliff0rentiation bear any reasonable relation to 
the pnrpose of the Act. If what is meant by the statutory 
term ''discount for cash'' is the discount many suppliers 
and manufacturers give to the retailer who pays prior 
to the tenth of the month, there is absolutely no reason 
for distinguishing this type of discount from a discount 
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received due to volume buyi11g or one received due to 
early buying. All of these discounts are available to the 
merchant who can qualify for them. Some merchants 
are in a position to buy early. Some merchants are in a 
position to buy in large volume. Other merchants may 
be in a position to pay early. One merchant may be in 
a position to take advantage of all of these discounts 
while another merchant might be able to take advan-
tage of only one. To distinguish between the discounts 
arbitrarily and unreasonably distinguishes between dif-
ferent types of merchandising operations. Cf. Cohen "· 
Frey & Son, Inc., 80 A.2d 267 (:Md. 1951 ). Economical!~· 
there is no basis foT such distinction since all of the 
discounts grant an equal advantage to the peTson who 
can take advantage of them and an equal disadvantage to 
the person who is unble to take advantage of them. There 
is nothing inherently different about discounts for 
prompt payment and discounts for volume or for early 
buying. They all amount to preferential treatment for 
particular purposes. The statutory discrimination be-
tween these types of discounts is unreasonable and arbi. 
trary in including discounts labeled trade discounts and 
excluding discounts labeled discounts for cash. See State 
v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1938). 
Another requirement of State v. Ma.son is tha,t the 
differentiation must bear a reasonable relation to the 
purposes to be accomplished by the Act. As sitated in 
Section 13-5-17 of the Act, the purpose of the Legislature 
in passing the Act was to ''safeguard the public against 
the creation or perpetuation of monopolies and to foster 
and encourage competition, by prohibiting unfair and 
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disaiminatory practices by which fair and honest com-
1wtition is destroyed or prevented.'' Discriminiating be-
tween ''trade discounts'' and ''discounts for cash'' can 
be sho\vn to bear no reasonable relation to this stated 
purpose of the Act. If a cash discount would be inimical 
to the purposes and policy of the Act, so would be a trade 
discount, since bo,th serve exactly the same function. 
The trial court in the case at bar concluded that "the 
statutory definition of cost by permitting the deduction 
of trade discounts and excluding the deduction of cash 
(liscounts is ambiguous and discriminates without rea-
son between type·s of discounts." (R. 44) This conclusion 
of the court is amply supported by the evidence adduced 
at the trial and by simple logic. 
POINT 6 
rrHE ACT IS ARBITRARY, UNREASON-
ABLE AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN PRO-
HIBITING RALES BELOW COST AS DE-
~'INED IN THE ACT -WHERE THE ONLY 
[NTENT OF A RETAILER IN PRICING THE 
ITEl\IS BELOW COST IS TO INDUCE CUS-
'l'Ol\1ERS OF THAT RETAILER TO PUR-
CHASE 0 THE R MERCHANDISE FROM 
THA'l' RETAILER, AND HENCE IS IN VIO-
LA'l'ION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND 
ARTICLI1J XII, §20 OF THE UTAH CON-
STITU'l'ION. 
There is ample evidence in the transcript of the trial 
that defendant Grand Central has a fairly stable clien-
tele. Much of the testimony of the witnesses for the de-
f ense was to the, effect that its pricing policies were de-
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veloped with the thought in mind of protecting its estab-
lished clientele, while of course increasing it ·where pos-
sible. (R. 53-55) Section 13-5-7 of the Sale-Below-Cost 
Act in snbsecti(rn (a) prnYidt>s: 
It is her0h>- declared that an>· ach·ertising, offer 
to sell, or sale of any merchandise, either by re-
tailers or wholesalers, at less than cost as defowd 
in this act with the i11te11t a11d 7mrpnse of i11d11cinq 
the purchase of ot71er 111ercha11dise or of unfnirlY 
diYerti11g trade from a competitor or otherwis;, 
iniuri11g a eompetitor impairs and prevents fair 
competitio11, injures public w0lfare, is unfair com-
p<•tition contrary to pnlJlic poliC')" and the policy of 
this act and is declared to he in ,-iolation of 
this act. 
rrhe italicized portion of the aliove-cited statute presr11(, 
the problem discussed in this Point. The Act would seem 
to prohibit a sale below cost with the intent and purpose 
of inducing the purchase of other merchandise regardle~s 
of the unfairness or fairness of the transaction and also 
regardless of who made the purchase or what was pur-
chased. This pnn-ision would seem to prohibit such a 
sale even if the sale \YNe for the sole purpose of in-
ducing a regular customer of defendant to purchasr 
other merchandise which a competitor did not eYen srll. 
The Act would se<>m to make no requirement that it he 
shown that such a transaction in any \my harme<l a 
competitor of defendant or took from the competitor an~· 
business. -As distinguished from the phrase which pro-
hibits unfairly diverting trade from a competitor, or in-
juring a competitor, the above-italicized portion of the 
Act prohibits conduct which is in 110 way shown to hann 
a competitor. Absent the element of harm to a com-
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1wtitor, there would be no harm to competition. Since 
there is no harm to competition, this provision is not 
reasouahly related to the purpose of the Act and is hence 
unconstitutional. See State v. Mason, 78 P.2d 920 
(Utah 1938). 
~Kven if the Act were interpreted to read that the 
sale l 1elow cost with the intent and purpose of inducing 
the purchase of other merchandise also required a show-
ing of diverting trade from another merchant, the statute 
would still he unconstitutional. In prohibiting a sale 
\rith the intent and purpose of inducing the purchase of 
11tlwr merchandise \\'hile not prohibiting a like sale with-
out 1 !tis intent and purpose, the statute sets up a classi-
fication. As set forth in State v. Maso11, supra, a classi-
licntion, in order to be deemed reasonable, must con-
tain some basis for the cliffrrentiation and must be rea-
'onably related to the purposes of the Act. Judicial no-
ticl' rnn he taken of the fad that all competitors are in 
ln1si11ess with the intent and purpose of inducing the pur-
rfou.;p of m<!rchandise. Inherent in the idea of compe-
tition is the fact that if one competitor makes a sale, an-
other competitor may lose a sale. Hence, the very es-
'-'<'11r•11ec• of our eompetitiYe system is that each partici-
pant is out to get all that he can get by fair means. In 
liO opcrntiug, one of the chief goals of the competitor is 
to <fo'ert lmsiness a\nly from his competitors. There is 
Hotl1iu.~ i11hen·ntly had about this goal - this is per-
fr>ctl~, h>gitimate business and is amply supported by the 
T'.tnl1 ( 1onstitutio11. 
Article X1 r, Section :W of the Utah Constitution ex-
presses the overriding co11cern of the members of the 
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Constitutional C011\'ention with the idea of frel' and un-
trammeled competition. This particular section of the 
Constitution was enacted specifically to promote and en-
force the idea of free competition. The Sale-Below-Cost 
Act was supposedly enacted in furtherance of this con-
stitutional policly. I\ othing in the italicized portion of 
the above-cited statute can be said to promote competi-
tion. The co11duet prohibited in this section is in fact the 
very essence of competition. In prohibiting such con-
duct, the statute goes contrary to the specific policy of 
the Utah Constitution. 
It should be noted that the italicized portion of the 
above-quoted statute should be read Rlong with its cfo,_ 
junctiYe phrase. Since the second phrase ''or of un-
fairly di'»erting trade from a competitor or otherwise in-
juring a competitor" is written in the disjunctive, it 
must he read that way. By placing an "or" before 
the second phrase, the obvious purpose of the Legislatme 
was to differentiate between the first and the second 
phrases. The second phrase requires Rn i11tent to treat 
unfairly or injure a competitor. The requirement of 
i11tcnt to injure provides the necessary criminal intent 
to support the criminal stafote. Such a requirement is 
strictly in line ·with the policy of Article XII, Seetion 20 
of the Utah Constitution, and the policy set out in Sec-
tion 13-5-17 of the Sale-Below-Cost Act. Statutes simi-
lar to the above-italicized portio11 of the Utah Act haw 
lwen held unconstitutional because they had no require-
ment of criminal i~1tent. ~':Uate ex rel. Anderson v. Flemill!J 
Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. El59); State v. Packard-BambPr-
ger & ('o., 8 A.2cl 291 (N. J. 1939); Englebrecht v. Day. 
~ll'\ P .2<1 338 (Okla. 19-±9). Since it cannot be read as in-
rl ncl i ng the rc·quircments of unfairness or injury, this por-
tion of the rtah Act must he held to be unconstitutional 
a~ a viola ti on of due process under the Federal Constitu-
t io11, aml Article XII. Section 20 of the Utah Consititu-
ti011. 8ee Fairmont Crramery Co. v. J1i11nesota, 274 U.S. 
1 ( 1927). 
Siguificant at this point is the enforcement proced-
ure of the Utah Trade Commission "·ith respect to this 
proYision of the Act. :Jir. J. Gonlon Browning, Execu-
fr;e Secretar:· of the l 1 tah State Trade Commission, tes-
tifiecl with respect to the enforcement procedures of the 
Trnde Commission. The follmving dialogue between Mr. 
Brom1in!;· and ~Ir. \Valdo is significant: 
Q. ( hy ~Ir. \Valdo) Let's take the ,·iolation that is 
alleged in the complaint here of selling Bayer 
Aspirin at less than cost. How do you deter-
mine the other, the more or less thing of the 
1·iolatio11, but the intent element of the viola-
tion f vYha t is your procedure in determining 
that aspect~ 
~\. Now as to the monopoly, it is my understand-
ing that the word "monopy" has been taken 
out. I am just not quite -
Q. \Vell, there are two elements involved in the 
1·iolatio11, is that not so? 
A. Right. 
Q. One you haYe to sell below cost, and second 
you l~ave to have one of these intents that is 
~leemed unlawful bv the Act. Now, what I am 
asking you is how. you determine the intent 
that is cle0med unlawful by the Act. 
A. Well, the fact that there is a legal price would 
indicate to me that it could be intended, if it is 
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below the legal price, and the person knows 
it is below the legal price. I would have to 
think that this in my mirnl would he intention. 
(R. 124-125) 
From the foregoing quote it will be observed that 
in enforcing this Act the Trade Commission in fact has 
a presumption of intent from the sale below cost. 'l'here 
is no statutory presumption provided for this purpose. 
Hence, the Trade Commission not only does not require 
any actual showing of unfairness or injury to a com-
petitor, but assumes or presumes intent from the fad 
that a sale was shown to be below cost. Such a presump-
tion of intent to induce the purchase of other merchan-
dise, along with the fact that thi8 phrase cannot be read 
in conjunction with the phrase providing for unfair or in-
jurious treatment to a competitor, renders the italicized 
phrase in the above-quoted statute completely unconsti-
tutional and contra the policy of the Act itself. 
Except for the stipulation of the parties as it relat•'' 
to Count I of the Complaint, there is no evide11ce what-
soever in the record in the instant case that defendants 
had any intent or purpose to unfairly divert trade from 
a competitor or o·therwise injure a competitor. There i.' 
evidence to support the proposition that defendants did 
have an intent and purpose to induce the purchase of 
O'ther ·merchandise. Intervenor-appellant argues that 
proof of an intent to gain business from a competitor j-, 
proof of an intent to injure the competitor. In support 
of this proposition, it cites La11ndry Operating Company 
Y. Spaldiug £a,undry & Dry Clcani11g Compmzy, 383 S.W. 
2d 364 (Ky. 1964). The plni11tiff i11 that case was ap-
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peal from a summary judgment entered against it on the 
ha sis of pretrial depositions, the opening statement of 
r·mms01, and the tc>stimony of its president and chief 
1rituess. It was agreed that no further additional faots 
in support of the complaint would have have been de-
wloped iu the course of the trial. At the trial a sum-
mar~· judgment dismissing the complaint was granted on 
the basis that there was not sufficient evidence to support 
a finding that defernlant had intended to injure competi-
tors and destroy competition. This dismissal was re-
nrsed on appeal. Upon thorough analysis of the exten-
sin' quote from the appellate opinion set out by inter-
Yenor-appellant at page 39 of its brief, it will be seen that 
tlir theory of the court in that case was unsound. In 
tliat case, the defendant had called on customers of its 
wmpetitor laundry company and offered them two weeks' 
free sen-ice if they would try its service. By this meth-
od the competitors' customers were lured to defend-
ant. The court held that in calling upon customers of 
its competitor and offering this free service, defendant 
k11e"· or should have known tlia.t he was unfairly divert-
ing trade from his competitors. It is submitted that 
thesp facts do not sustain the holding of the court. Even 
if the facts do sustain the holding, the facts were much 
more gross than any invoked in the instant case. In 
110 part of the instant case were either of the defendants 
kno"·ingly soliciting particular customers of competi-
tors. All they were doing was trying to expand their 
l1wu hnsi11ess. The court stated in Laundry Operating 
ro., "vVe do not suggesit that a purpose to divert or 
r·apture a competitor's business is wrong or unethical. It 
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is perfectly legitimate so long as it is not carried out 
unfairly." Laundry Operating Co. v. Spalding Laundry 
& Dry Cleaning Co., supra at 3G6. The whole essence of 
the case was that it was not too difficult to infer intent , 
from the actions of defendant. That is, intent to injure its 
competitors, when it went right out aml solicirted spe-
cific customers ·which it knew it would be taking from 
competitors. Nothing approaching this conduct occurred 
in the case now before the court. 
Even if a presumption of intent was explicitly pro-
vided under the Utah Act, such a prnsumption ·would he 
unconstitutional, under cases cited by appellant and cases 
cited herein a:t 72 supra. On page 34 of its brief, inter-
venor-appellant cites Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Com-
pany v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp 70 (D. Minn. 1938). 
Intervenor-appellant cites this case for the proposi-
tion that, ''although the court held the statute in ques-
tion unconstitutional on grounds which clo 11ot apply to 
the instant case, the court specifically held that the 
legislature may properly presume that the markup ma)· 
be fL'\:ed at 10% in the absence of a showing of a lesser 
markup." Brief of Intervenor-App(~llant 34. True, the 
the legislature may indulge in such a presumption umlt>r 
certain conditions. However, this statemeut by inter-
venor-appellant is expressly contrary to the holding of 
this case.. The case, expressly holds that the 10% pre-
sumption in the absence of proof of a lesser cost is un-
constitutional. In this regard, the court states: 
With respect to the presumption created by the 
sixth paragraph of seetion 3 of part 2, we haw 
already pointed out that, in our opinion, the fact 
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of guilty i11te11t is not reasonably to be inferred 
from the fact of sale at less than 10% per cent [sic] 
abore thp, cost of the goods. No doubt, the pre-
sumption of guilt would be helpful to the sfate in 
the prosecution of alleged violators of the statute, 
but it would be as hurtful to the accused as it 
would be helpful to the accusor. Intent is some-
thing which is easily asserted and hard to dis-
prove. To ca~c;t upon a merchant who has sold 
goods at less than 10% per cent [sic] above their 
cost, the burden of establishing that the sale was 
not made with an 1:nte-nt to injure competitors or 
destroy competition, subjects him to unreasonable 
hardship. We think the disadvantage to him of the 
presumption of guilt should be regarded as out-
\Veighing the advantage of the presumption to 
the state. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Erv-
i1t, supra, at 82. (Emplia.sis added.) 
POINT 7 
TH.HJ T~JRl\IS "UNFAIRLY DIVERTING 
TRADE jj'ROl\f A COMPETITOR," "INJUR-
ING A COMP:B"JTITOR," and "LEGAL PRICES 
01'-, A COMPETITOR" AS USED IN THE UN-
FAIR PRACTICES ACT ARE UNCONSTITU-
TIONALLY VAGUE, AMBIGUOUS AND DO 
N(Yr SUFFICIENTLY WARN THE POTEN-
TIAL VIOLATOR OF THE PROHIBITED 
ACTS AS CONSTRUED AND APPLIED BY 
THE TRADE COMMISSION. 
Thti Uuifrd States Supreme Court has held that: 
... a statute which either forbids or requires the 
doing of an act in terms so vague thait men of 
common intelligence must necessarily t,'lless at its 
meaning and differ as to its application violates 
the first essential of due process of law. Connally 
v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). 
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The standard of definiteness required by the Utah 
court in order to sustain tlw validity of a statute owr 
a charge of void for vagueness is adequately set forth 
by l\Ir. Justice Crockett in the case of State v. Packard, 
1 
250 P.2d 561 (Utah 1952). In thait case, Russell Packard 
was convicted of failing to register with the Industrial 
Commission before commencing employment. Conviction 
was had under a Utah statute requiring '' eYery person 
before commenciug employment with a person, firm or 
corpora.tion whose employees are out on a labor strike 
called by a national recog11ized 1111ion to register with thr 
Industrial Commission of Utah." Section 49-1-29, Utah 
Code Ann. (1943). (Emphasis added.) Defendant con-
tended that this statute was void because it was Yagne 
and uncertain. The phase relied upon iu the argume11t 
for vagueness was the phrase "called by a national ree-
ognized union." Defendant argued that these terms ·were 
not susceptible of definition sufficient to ·warn defendall! 
of the possible consequences of his action. 
With respect to the questio11 of uncertainty nrn1 
vagueness of statutes, the con rt set down some staudards 
which should be applied in the case at bar. The court hP1<1 
that a statute, in order to he 1·alicl, must be sufficiently 
definite. 
" (a) to inform persons of ordiua ry intelligence, 
who would be law abiding, what their conduct 
must be to conform to its requirements; (b) to ad-
vise a defendant accused of violating it just what 
constitutes the offense with which he is charged, 
and (c) to be susceptible of unform interpretatioll 
and applicatiou by those charged ·with respon-
sibility of applying a ud enforcing it." State '" 
Packard, supra. at 564. 
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ln applying these starnlards to the wording of the statute 
irnrolved in the Packard case, the court held that the 
terms ''a national recognized union'' injected such uncer-
tai11ty into the statute a.s to render it void for vagueness. 
'l'he court held that the problem with the terms as used 
in the statute was that one could not ascertain who wa.s 
to recognize the union, if it was to be recognized, whether 
it was to be recognized by the public generally, by other 
lahor organizations, by industrial leaders, by the NLRB 
or some other source, or whether the average citizen 
liaving heard of the union gaYe it national recognition. 
The court went on to state: 
There is, of course, no legal standard referred to 
in the statute or known to us, by which it may 
be determined what a "nationally recognized" 
union is. State v. Packard, supra, at 564. 
Absent such a standard, the court held the statute un-
co118ti tutioual. The further pro bl em inherent in this 
::;taJtuk, the court held, was that a person of average 
iutelligeuce could not conveniently identify which unions 
would come within the statute and which unions would 
not. 'l1he uncertainties of the statute were such that a 
1wrs011 might he ''perplexed to know whether he had to 
l'C'gistcr before going to work. Therefore, the statute is 
so indefinite and uncertain that it is unconstitutional, as 
ruled hy the lower court." State 1'. Packard, supra, at 
;)G5. 
A similar problem arose in an earlier Utah case, 
Henrie\'. Rocky Jlitn. Packing Corp., 202 P.2d 727 (1949). 
'I'his opinion was written a.s the result of a rehearing of 
the case originally heard and reported in 196 P.2d 487 
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(1948). The case i1ffolved the prons1011s of Sectio!l 
14-6-:3 of the Utah Code Annotated (1943). That statute 
made it a misdemem1or to employ a minor under the age of 
18 years "in any place of employment, dangerous or pre-
.furl icial to the life, health, saf etv or welfare of snch 
minor." (Emphasis added.) Young 1\I r. l\fenrie was 
killed as a result of possible 11egligrnce on the part of 
his employer. The issue of the case was whether the 
father of the deceased youth should be able sue hiR 
employer for wrongful death or whether thP accident 
'Nas under the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission 
and governed by limitations on liability. The court had, 
in a previous case, determined that the question of 
whether the Industrial Commission or the court had 
jurisdiction was hased upon whether a misdeamenor lrn(l 
in fact been committed by the clef endant. If n crime 
had been committed, or if decrased was illegally em-
ployed, the trial court would haw sol0 jurisdiction. If 
he was legally employed, the Commission had exclnsire 
jurisdietion. ·whether he ·was legally or illegally rm-
poyed depended upon whetlier his place of employmcllt 
was ''dangerous or prejudicial'' to health, life or safety 
i11 violation of the aboYe-cited statute. The kr)· ·word 
in the statute is ''dangerous.'' The court in the H enriP 
case held that the term ''<lang0rous,'' being }t compara-
ti,·e term, was too ,·ague and ambiguous to constitute 
the standard for a crime>. The court states: 
It is a principle too familiar to require cit~­
tion of authorit)·, that penal statutes, to be consti-
tutional, must lw clear and definite i11 their terms 
so that there mav he kuo·wn exactly what conduct 
is proscrih8(]. Henrie Y. Rocky· Mtn. I'acki11r1 
('orp., s111Jra, at 729. 
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In referring to the term "dangerous,'' the court 
l'alleu it an "accordian" term. The problem with the 
term was the she:ir difficulty placed upon an employer 
to detenninc whether or not his business was "danger-
011s. '' Tlw court goes on to point out that some busi-
11<·sses arc knffwll to he dangerous. Such are called the 
i 11hc·re11tly dangerous buRinesses such as mining, quarry-
ing-, railroadi11g, and manufacturing of explosives and 
dangerous chemicals. In such indnstries there would be 
110 <louht as to the dangerous nature. However, any 
irnli1stry or any li11e of work can possibly lead to injury 
or r1allger. 'l'he court pointed out that there was abso-
l11tel~· no "safe" work if that term were used literally. 
Since all businesses were not considered safe and all 
linsi110sses were not considen'd dangerous, a burden was 
plnced upon the clef enclant of making his own decisions 
as to 'idwther his business was dangerous. Such a bur-
ll<·n, ihe court held, could uot be placed upon the defend-
ant. The statute placing such a burden upon a potential 
d<·i'eH<lallt is so ambiguous and ,·ague as to violate the 
collSt it u t io11al standards. 
At th is point, it is essential to note that in the 
lfe11ric case there was no prosecution for violation of 
a criminal statute. This was a ciYil suit for damages. 
The court, however considered the criminal statute as 
a necC>SRHl)T part of the ci\·il case, since a determination 
of whether or not defendant had committed a crime was 
essential to the civil case. 
'The terms ''unfairly diverting trade from a com-
pditor,'' ''injuring a competitor,'' or ''legal prices of 
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a competitor" are just as \'ague, ambiguous and im-
possible of definition a.s were the terms "national 
recognized union'' and ''dangerous'' used iu the abo\'e-
cited cases. 
(A) What is meant by the terms "unfairly diverting 
trade from a competitor'''? 
This phrase contains not just one but at lea.st three 
"accordian" terms. First, the term "unfairlv" should 
be considered. This word is definitely a word c011taining ' 
moral and ethical conotations. Fairness is a product of 
the cultural development of any particular society or 
sub-society. It is obvious that what is fair to one persou 
is not necessarily fair to another. Fairness is also equated 
to the equally-undefinable term of justice. People ge11-
erally feel that they have been dealt with fairly if they 
have been dealt with justly. The United States Supreme 
Court in the case of United States v. L. ('ohen Grocery 
Co., 255 U.S. 81, 89 (1921) had before it a statute which 
made a person liable to criminal penalty if he willfully 
made "any unjust or unrea,sonable rate of charge in 
handling or dealing in or with any nece,ssities." ln deal-
ing with this statute, the court held that the above-quoted 
phrase made the sitatute void for vagueness in violation 
of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion in that it did not require an ascertainable standard 
of guilt. The term "unfairly" in the statute at bar 
suffers from the same i11firmity. It is truly an elastic 
term the definition of which is based upon the snh-
' 
jective feeling and the cultural heritagP of the person 
making the definition. 
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Tlw next portion of this phrase to be considered is 
the word "diverting." The very essence of competition 
is the di version of business from someone else to oneself. 
'ro coueretely define the term "diverting" as used in 
the Utah Unfair Practices Act, however, is no easy task. 
Ts it a diverting of trade from a competitor to sell to 
a regular customer of the seller an item which he might 
not ordinarily buy'? Thr proceeding point can be illus-
trated by a hypothetical: Suppose a customer is in 
(lrfendant Grand Central 's store purchasing tobacco 
protlucts which are "on sale.'' This customer is a regu-
lar customer of the store for tobacco products. However, 
on the particular occasion, as he enters the store he 
knows he needs some coffee, so in addition to his tobacco 
prndncts hr purchases some coffee. Competitor "A" 
of Grand Central does not sell coffee. Competitor "B'' 
sells coffee of a brand different than that sold by Grand 
Cc11tral. Comprtitor "C" sells the same brand of coffee 
as Grand Central. Has this purchase diverted trade 
from competitors "A", "B" or "C"? In order to 
rlin•rt from someone, it must be shown that they initially 
had this trade. -Which of the above competitors has the 
trade? Jn order to have the intent of unfairly diverting 
this trncle from a competitor, a defendant would have 
to know who i11itially had the trade. How would defend-
ant know who had the trade? Diverting connotes that 
the flow at one time was going in one direction and was 
later changed to another direction. Webster's 7th New 
( 'ollegiate Dictionary defines the term "to di,,ert" as 
"to turn in opposite direc,tions," "to turn aside," "to 
turn from one course or use to another." All of the 
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aforementioned definitions require an existing courne 
of action from which the di,Tersion results. Docs tlw 
Utah Unfair Practices Act require that a course of 
business be shown inn>lving a competitor from whicl1 
the defendant diverted the trade 7 Or, cloes the staitnte 
only require that a defendant make a sale and thereby 
imply that he must have diverted trade from someonc 
else who was not able to make this sale 1 In not further 
defining the term "diverting,'' the statute becomes 
vague and ambiguous and impossible to administer. 
Further in the phrase "unfairly diverting trade from a 
competitor" we find the ~word "competitor." Defining 
a compe1titor is quite difficult in realit~T because it de-
pends upon the circumstances. \Vhich of the stores 
aforementioned, ''A'', '' B' ', or '' C '', are competitors 
of defendant? Does def end ant Grand Central, with its 
store in Murray, compete with the stores of defendant 
Skaggs in Bountiful? Does the Bountiful store of 
defendant Skaggs compete with the store of Shopper's 
Discount located on 35th South in Salt Lake Cityf Does 
the store of def end ant Grand Central in Salt Lake City 
compete with the sitore of def eudant Skaggs in Provo 1 
Does the store of defendant Grand Central located in 
Salt Lake City compete with the store of one of the 
members of intervenor-appellant located in Midvale? 
The precise definition of this term "competitor" is 
required in the statute in several aspects. In the first 
place, the statute prohibits unfairly diverting trade from 
a competitor; secondly, it prohibits the injuring of a com-
petitor; and thirdly, it grants an exemption for meeting 
the legal prices of a competitor. How close mnst two 
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stores be in order to be competitors? Must the stores 
cany the Rame lirnlHls in order to be competitors? Must 
the' stores be tl1e same i:iize in order to be competitors? 
Must defendant be aware of the existence of another 
store in order to han it as a competitor? None of these 
ll ll('stions are answered by the statute. 
(B) vVhat is meant by the phrase "injuring a com-
pe1ti tor'' "I 
The term competitor has been discussed above. 
Therefore, the present discussion will be concerned with 
the tPrm "injuring." This term would also seem to be 
quit0 dastic. It is nowh0re pointed out in the statute 
what is meant by injuring. ~lust there be monetary 
damages provable in order to show an injury? The 
stait ute states that "actual damages" of the plaintiff 
11eed not be alleged and proved. Section 13-5-14. But 
must there he a certain amount of monetary damage in 
order to shm\- an injuryJ How would a prospective 
defornlaut know he was "injuring a competitor"? From 
its mere statement and the proceeding questions, it be-
C'omes ob1-ious that this term is not susceptible of a.n 
l'Xad definition. It will he noted from a close examina-
tion of Section 13-5-7 of the Utah Ac1t that the statute 
has disjunctive phrases. It provides that a violaition will 
he made out for "unfairly diYerting trade from a com-
petitor'' and then Rt ates ''or otherwise injuring a com-
prtitor." 'rhe <lisjuuctive "or" as used with the word 
otherwise indicaites that the "injuring a competitor" 
spoken of in this sense is something different and apart 
from unfairly di1-erting trade from said competitor. It 
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is very difficult to e1ffision what conhl be meant hy this 
last phrase. Conceivably it could mean that if a pros-
pective defendant is selling below cost and in a barroom 
one night pokes his competitor hC' has ''otherwise injured , 
the competitor.'' The absurdity of the preceding example 
points out explicit!>- the n1gue11ess of the phrase'. 
In support of the proposition that "a husinessmau 
knows who his compe,titors are,'' intervenor-appellants 
cite McElhone v. Geror, W2 N.-w. 414 (1\Iimi. 1940). The 
facts of this case, as previously stated, reveal that no 
evidenc-e 'diatsoever was introduced on the ques,tion of 
competition. It follows, therefore, that upon introduction 
of evidence it may well he shown that the term "com-
petitor'' is vague and ambiguous and the businessmai1 
does 1wt kno\Y who his competitors arc. The court in 
McElhone states, 
On this point the statute is definite and certain, 
enough so anyivay, to fend off the presen.t attack 
so far as it proceeds on the supposition that it 
is otherwise. McEllwne Y. Geror, supra at 419. 
The language of tl1e court is an admission that it did not 
have before it the facts upon which it could determine 
whether or not the statute was m1constitutional. 
Intc'1Tenor-appellaut cites Borden Co. Y. Thomason, 
353 S.\V. 2d 735 (l\lo. 1962) as upholding a statute 
against constitutional challenge of vagueness and un-
certainty. The quote set fol"th at the top of page 30 uf 
inten-enor-a ppellant 's hrief supposedly upholds the 
proposition. It is submitted that the words of the quote 
in themselves answer the ques>tion in favor of df>fendant. 
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"Whether or not a sale below cost has unfairly diverted 
trade is a matter of proof in each instance and must 
rlepe11d 011 the facts aiul circmnsfances shown." Borden, 
supra, at 734. The milk statute involved in the Borden 
case contained no criminal penalty and the court made 
much of this in its discussion of Yagueness and definition 
of terms. The trial court found the issues for tlw plain-
tiff and granted the injunction. Defendants and inter-
n•1tors appealed. There ~was extensiYe c\·idence taken in 
the case. Plaintiff presented evidence as to the vague-
ness, indefiniteness aml impracticability of the applica-
1 ion of the Act and testified as to its accounting methods 
::ind its allocation of costs, showing that it was impractical 
if 11ot impossible to segregate its costs down to a specific 
such as a bottle of milk or a carton of cottage cheese. 
Plaintiff offered a witness, a11 accounting professor from 
a m1iversity, who ~was qualified as an expert and stated 
that th<:> cost of a half pint of milk sold to a dairy custo-
mer on a particular day simply could not be ascertained. 
A witness for defendauts testified that average prices 
have to be used lwcause one cannot know whether a par-
ticular amount of D base product went into certain other 
productR. 'l1his is the case because there were by-products 
left onr from the milk pasteurization. At page 750 the 
court states: 
vVe quite agr<:>e that the cost of doing business, as 
mentioned in the statute, including labor costs, 
salaries paid executives and officers, rent, inrter-
(•st, <leprecia ti on, power supplies, maintenance of 
equipment, selling costs, advertising, transporta-
tion and delivery cost, credit losses and all types 
of permits and license fees, all taxes, insuran.ce 
and ov0rhead expenses of the processor or dis-
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tributor as m:n~ionecl in Sec. 1 [ 5] ( § 416.410 [ 5]) 
cannot be cldm1tely and exactly determined upon 
a day, hour or minute basis, or with reference to 
a particular quart of milk delin•red ou a particu-
lar date. The statute makes no such rrq11ire111e 11 t. 
Praetically all of the items mentioned in Sec. 
416.410 [ 5] accrue or a re paid or the losses are 
sustained over some reasonable period of time. 
Some lapse of time is necessary to determi11e 
thPm. Clearly arerage costs may be used in the 
determinin gof the cost of any product controlled 
by the statute. (Emphasis add rd.) 
It is imperatin in the Borden case to note that the Agri-
cultural Commissic.n of Missouri was empowered to make 
rules and regulations govrrning this statute. It "·as 
argued that all that '>ms rcquin•cl to comply ·with the 
statute was a good faith attempt to allocate c@ts. But 
the court states at page 752: 
It is apparent we lwlieYe that to permit rosts 
to be ascertained only on a "good faith'' and 
reasonableness" basis u·ould leace each processor 
a11d dealer to determiue his 01cn method of dctrr-
mining cost and the ralirlity of each method cou/r/ 
only be tested a11d fi11a1ly dcter1111:ned by litigatio11. 
We must ancl do hold that [the stafote] is valid 
and enforceable as against respondent's conten-
tions; and that any alleged Yagueness, i11defi11ite-
ness or difficulty in a1Jplication may be remedied 
by. reasonable rules a11d regulations which the 
Commissio11 ltas tlte a11tltority to adopt. (FJmpha-
sis added.) 
So it can he sern from this ease that the court realized 
' the unworkableness of the trst askea for by inten-euor-
appellant, that of reasonableness, for reasonableness, in 
e\·ery case and for every perso11, i:-; goi11g to be different. 
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Tltr :::;tandard of reasonableness asked for by appellant, 
1rnnl<l make the Utah Sale-Below-Cost statute equally 
irnpossihle to inforce. 
( C) The final term to he considered under this 
poi ll t ic; the term "legal prices of a competitor" as set 
forth i11 Section 13-5-12(d) of the Utah Code Annotated. 
In granting an ex0mption from the Unfair Practices 
)1.ct for sales made in order to meet the "legal prices 
of a competitor" the statute really grants nothing to a 
potrntial defendant. \Vhat is meant by the term "legal" 
cnnuot he deterrni11ed. ]'or example, does this term mean 
leg-al as looked upon by a court, the Trade Commission, 
1.l1c police, the FBI, or the potential defendant. Actually, 
a legal price of a ddenclant could only be determined 
after a court hearing and a court determination on the 
matter. Anything short of this '''ould be speculation. 
In n:quiriug a defendant to speculate as to what the 
prircs of a competitor are, the statute becomes vague 
nnd amhignous aml unenforceable. State ex rel. Ander-
son v. Flc111i11g Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1959). 
11 he e11forcement procedure of the Trade Commis-
,;io11 as tPsiifiecl to by .1\I r. Gordon Browning indicates 
that thP Commission requires a retailer to determine at 
ltis I>Pril whethpr a competitor, in advertising or selling 
a }><1rtieular item, is advertising or selling below cost as 
defined in the Act, with the intent prohibited in the Act, 
SPr: (R. 123-124). In other words, as interpreted by 
tlir Trade Commission, the Act seems to require a pros-
prcti ,,e defendant, before he ran meet the prices of a 
\'ompetitor, to determine the subjecitive intent of that 
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competitor, siuce an illegal price requires a finding of 
intent. If this be the ,-alid interpretation of this other-
\vise vague act, such a11 interpreitation puts an unreason-
able burden upon the defendant and is ,-oid for that ! 
reason. See ( R. 120-139.) 
In the instant case, the lower court in its conclusion 
2(a) held that "defendants were entitled to assume the 1 
advertised price of Shopper's Discount for Aqua Net 
Hair Spray was the legal price in the absence of actual 
knowledge of an illegal sale by Shopper's Discount in 
violation of the Act" (R. 46.) This is in fact the lower 
com't's interpretation of what is meant by the good faitl1 
meeting of the legal prices of competition exception to 
the Utah statute. The lower court, in fact, concluder! 
that it is good faith to meeit the advertised price of a 
competitor absent any actual knowledge that the price is 
not legal. This view is supported by the cases, State el' 
rel. Anderson v. Commercial Cal/Illy Co., 201 P.2d 1034, 
1038 (Kan. 1949). See State c:x: rel. Anderson v. Flemi11g 
Co., 339 P.2d 12 (Kan. 1959). Under this interpretation, 
the statute in this regard could be uphelcl as constitu-
tional since it places no affirmativ0 lmrden upon a pros-
pective defendant. Intervenor-app0llant cites the case 
of Mcintyre v. Borofsky, 59 A.2d 471 (N.H. 1948), in 
support of the proposition that defeudants do not haYe 
to examine the books of a competitor. The court in tlwt 
case as quoted by internnor-appcllant on page 54 of 
its brief states: 
"If this required the retailer to examine his 
competitor's books to ~1 scertain whether the com-, 
petitors [sic] price was legal, it would he of 
doubtful validity.'' 
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\rith this defendant certainl~· agrees. Since a defendant 
<'annot be validl~· required to examine his competitors' 
hooks, and since aH testified by the witnesses at the trial 
of this matter, no competitor will tell his competitor what 
he has paid for certain items or ·whether he is selling tlw 
items hC>low cost, the statute is unconstitutional if con-
.~trn<:•ll to so require. 
In support of its proposition that the statute in 
question in this case is not so vague and indefinite as 
to violate' constitutional standards, intervenor-appellant 
eites the [Tnited States Y. National Dairy Products Corp., 
:i12 l'.S. 29 (1963), a case upholding the Robinson-Pat-
man Act as not vague and ambiguous in the use of the 
1t>rms "unreasonably low prices for the purpose of 
destroying competition or eliminating a compe,titor." 
111tern•11or-appella11t iH seriously mistaken in character-
izing the statute in the instant case as similar to the 
Rohirnwn-Patma11 Act. First, it should be noted that 
tlw Robinson-Patman Act did nothing more thm1 codify 
tli0 standard of reasonableness which has been held for 
yPars to be the standard in cases of due process. The 
Tltnli ease sds out specific terms such as cost, cost of 
doi11g l)/(siness, unfairly direrting trade from a competi-
tor, i'llj11riilg a competitor, legal prices of a competitor, 
and others. 'l'hese terms are nowhere defined and it is 
ohYious from tlw evidence and findings of the court in 
the instant case that there is sufficient ambiguity here 
that eYen the two defendants involved in the case define 
the terms differently. It should also be noted that the 
Hohinso11-Patma11 Act contains no presumption such as 
is contained in the Utah Act. A presumption, coupled 
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with vague and ambiguous la11guage, makes a statute· 
much more vulnerable Rince it shifts to the defrrn1ant 
a much greater burden. 
At page 50 of its brief, inkrvenor-appellant state~: 
It should be noted that, contrary to the def end-
ants' allegations, part of the clause is defined. 
The word "unfair" obviously ref em back to the 
terms '' ad\-ertising, off er to sell, or sale ... at 
less than cost.'' 
Intervenor-appellants cite no authority for this ''obvious 
conclusion." The statute does not specifically declare 
what is unfair. The intervenor-appellant's citation to 
Laitndry Operating Co. v. Spalding La1111dry & Dry 
Gleaming Co., 383 S.W. 2d 364 (Ky. 1964), at page :il 
does not cover this point. The quote set forth there is 
not concerned with the definiteness of the Act but with 
the propriety of the legislative purpose. Defendant8 
are not arguing that the Legislature canuot set UJJ 
standards. People v. Payless Drugs and State v. Srars 
cited on page 53 for the "legal prices of competitors" 
proposition have been distinguished pr(~viously on their 
f a0ts. 
On page 54 of its brief, intervenor-appellant cites 
State v. Albertson's Inc., 412 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1966) as 
being in accord with the following quote from State '· 
Sears, 103 P.2d 337 (Wash. 1940): 
We are, therefore, of the opinion tlmt if a mer-
chant in good faith reduces his prices to meet 
those of a competitor, who he in good faith be-
lieves has a legal price, he will not he violating 
either the intent or the wording of the Act. 
It should be noted that in the Albertson case, the defeml-
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ant was ai·guing that he was entitled to a presumption 
that prices found on the open market were legal until 
otherwise slmwn. Tlie eourt upheld this argument aud 
sta te<l, 
If, by the aboYe-quoted evidence, the state did 
not intend to concede the legality of Albertson's 
competitors' prices, it should have offered evi-
dece to overcome the presumption that published 
prices of its competitors were legal prices. State 
v. Albertson's Inc., supra. 
Hence the Albertson case goes much farther than the 
good faith requirement. It holds exactly what defendants 
luwe contenclt•d and ~what the trial court held in its con-
du;.:ion: that absent any knowledge of an illegal price, 
tlH•re i::-; a presumptiou that published prices are legal. 
In the firnt pnragraph of page 55 of its brief, inter-
H'nor-appellant states that it disagrees with the court's 
conclusion that a hsent actual knowledge there is a pre-
:,;umptio11 that a sale by competitor is legal, and then 
~oes off 011 an argument that defendants had a duty of 
nffirmati,,e action. The case previously cited by inter-
nnor-appellant, State v. Albertson's, Inc., 412 P.2d 755 
(Wash. 1966) refutes its argument. That court uphold 
the presumption of legality and put upon the state the 
burden of rebutting such presumption. Accord, State 
e.r re1. Andenwn v. Commercial Candy Co., 201P.2d1034 
(Kan. 1949). 'Phe state, in the ease at bar, did not pron 
that at the time they priced their hair spray defendants 
knew that the price set out hy Shopper's Discount was 
in fact illegal. 'l1his was the burden placed upon the 
"tarte. Dutil this burden is met, according to the case 
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cited by intervenor-appellant then• is no requirement 
that def end ant go forward with a11ything. 
POINT 8 
N()T 
THE COURT DID"'ERR IN HOLDING THAT 
PLAINTIF1 F FAILED TO INTRODUCE SUF-
FICIENT EVID:BJNCE TO SHO-W THAT DE-
FENDANT GRAND CENTRAL, IN MAKING 
THE SALE OF ASPIRIN, LEE'S MEN'S 
PANTS AND TURKEYS INTENDED TO IN-
DUCE THE PURCHASE OF OTHER MER-
CHANDISE OR 11 0 UNLAWFULLY DIVERT 
TRADE FROl\I A COMPETI1'0R OR TO 
OTHERWISE IN.JURE A COJ\f PETITOR 
The hurclen of proof was upon the plaintiff and it 
was not met. Appellant aml intcrn•nor-appellant cite:; 
no part of the record to support their position. 
Further, it should be pointed out that the tram;cript 
of the trial at R.77 is in error i11 that the answer "Yes" 
on line 1 should be ''No.'' Defemlant Grand Central has 
mo'\'ed to haYe the record corrected arn1 an ord0r maki11g 
the correction was signed on Fehruary 16, 1968. R. 
186-188. 
CONCLUSION 
After an adequate hearing 011 the facts, the trial 
court held the Utah Unfair Practices act to he unc011-
sti tutional in several respects. It is a price-fixing 
statute; it m1co11stitutionally shifts the burden of proof 
to a defendant; its presumptions are arbitrary and m1-
reasonable; its terms an~ ill c·o11ceived and ill defined, 
rendering them unconstitntiminlly vag1w; its classifiea 
tions arc unconstitnti01tall~- clis('riminatory; arn1 i11 
practice, it is impossible to nclmi11istcr. 
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\Vithout c'XC'eptio11 the cases cited by appellants 
\rhich uphold similar statutes have been cases which did 
not arise 011 a fully denloped set of facts, as did the 
case at bar. "With the evidence before it, the trial court 
con<'lmled that the Act, in its application to defendants, 
coukl uot be sustained under the Utah and Federal con-
stitutions. The holding of a trial court, based upon the 
evide11ce presented, should not be overturned. 
Since the time of its inception, the Utah Constitu-
tion has protected the people of this state against 
immeronR attacks by persons intent upon destroying 
tlw idea of free competition. The Unfair Practices Act, 
promokd by and e1iacte<l through the insistence of 
1wrso11s in the position similar to that of intervenor-
appellants, is i11imical to this traditional concept of free 
l'Ompetitio11 and f"!.'ee enterprise as applied to defendants. 
'l'li is Act was ill conccind and very poorly drafted. As 
a result, it seriously impinges upon the rights of respond-
\'llts nrnl others similarly situated. 
Therefore, it is submitted that the facts, as adduced 
at t rinl, ancl the law, as herein before set forth, amply 
support the findings of the trial court. The Utah Unfair 
Practices Act is unconstitutional. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE & MANGUM 
ROBERT M. YEATES 
DENIS R. MORRILL 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent Grand Central 
Stores, Inc., d/b/a Warshaw's 
Giant Foods and Grand 
Central Drugs, Inc. 
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